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The explosion in the use of software in important sociotechnical systems has renewed focus on the study of
the way technical constructs reflect policies, norms, and human values. This effort requires the engagement of
scholars and practitioners from many disciplines. And yet, these disciplines often conceptualize the operative
values very differently while referring to them using the same vocabulary. The resulting conflation of ideas
confuses discussions about values in technology at disciplinary boundaries. In the service of improving this
situation, this paper examines the value of shared vocabularies, analytics, and other tools that facilitate
conversations about values in light of these disciplinary specific conceptualizations, the role such tools play in
furthering research and practice, outlines different conceptions of “fairness”deployed in discussions about
computer systems, and provides an analytic tool for interdisciplinary discussions and collaborations around
the concept of fairness. We use a case study of risk assessments in criminal justice applications to both
motivate our effort–describing how conflation of different concepts under the banner of “fairness” led to
unproductive confusion–and illustrate the value of the fairness analytic by demonstrating how the rigorous
analysis it enables can assist in identifying key areas of theoretical, political, and practical misunderstanding
or disagreement, and where desired support alignment or collaboration in the absence of consensus.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Governments, companies, and the technologists they employ are increasingly being called to
task for the social consequences of the technologies they build and use. Architectures, interfaces,
configurations, defaults, and algorithms must yield their biases and impacts on values such as
privacy, equality, security, freedom of expression, and access to information. This increased focus
on the values reflected in the technical artifacts themselves and the larger organizational structures
they reconfigure rests on the insight that technology is not merely a tool of implementation, but
constitutive of an organization’s values commitments in practice. In particular, a growing body
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of work focuses on how to produce technical artifacts and organizational structures that promote
values such as fairness, accountability, transparency, and explainability in software systems.
This keen focus on the values implications of technological choices, both independently and
relationally, is a break with past practice where biases and values were largely viewed as exogenous
to technical design, and addressed through the adoption of legal rules and institutional policies
and processes. Academic traditions of interrogating the values of technical and sociotechnical
systems have deep roots from multiple disciplines, including science & technology studies, law,
philosophy, HCI, and computer science & engineering (e.g., [22, 27, 50, 89, 90, 96, 126, 151]). In
addition to the critical analysis of understanding values in technical artifacts, a body of research
has also articulated a constructive agenda to build artifacts that promote or embed particular social
values [45, 48, 111].
This move from critical interrogation of values in technical artifacts and systems to a constructive
agenda is arduous and requires sustained work across disciplines [46]. Advancing a constructive
approach to building values into technical systems requires shifts in some disciplines’ orientation
toward values. It requires an openness in the technical community to view values as endogenous or
at least co-constituted by system design. It requires individuals with the disposition, skill, resources,
and intellectual breadth to bridge different disciplines. Constructive work to embed values also
requires new tools. Researchers and practitioners from disparate disciplines need conceptual and
methodological tools that allow them to flesh out the problem, develop a research agenda, and
work with relevant values—the “values at play” [45]. These tools are an integral component of the
infrastructure necessary to support cross-disciplinary work.1
In this paper we use the term “infrastructure” in two ways. First, this paper helps to build and
support the research infrastructure necessary to support the work of the interdisciplinary group
of researchers and practitioners in the emerging loosely coordinated community of technologists,
social scientists, lawyers, and policymakers studying fairness, accountability, transparency, explain-
ability, and other values in software systems. We provide a definitional overview documenting
how “fairness” in this emerging field is used across the disciplines represented. We also provide
a Fairness Analytic, a set of dimensions to discuss or think through what is meant by “fairness”
across multiple conceptions or disciplines. These are first steps toward the development of a shared
mapping of vocabularies, and a tool to aid researchers in avoiding misunderstanding, or to engage
in more constructive debates of difference.
Second we use “infrastructure” as a conceptual lens, going beyond referring to social and technical
resources and artifacts. The analytical lens of infrastructures asks us to pay attention to thework and
practices done in the “background” that maintain and support sociotechnical systems [14, 127, 141].
This lens also recognizes that the practices, resources, and artifacts that make up an infrastructure
are themselves values-laden and political.
Vocabularies scaffold research; yet like other infrastructure, they often go unnoticed despite
their essential contribution to interdisciplinary work [141]. Below we describe the importance
of cross-disciplinary infrastructure; describe five ways shared vocabularies support productive
cross-disciplinary work; offer a definitional overview of concepts of fairness, examining how the
term is defined and conceptualized in different disciplines; provide a Fairness Analytic to provide a
set of dimensions to discuss concepts fairness across definitions and disciplines; apply these tools to
a case study; and reflect on this work as an incremental step toward building a shared vocabulary
that fosters the collaborative work of this emerging community. While the community focused
1We use the term cross-disciplinary throughout as Paul Jeffrey does “to mean all forms of collaboration between researchers
with different educational backgrounds” [74].
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on the terms we consider here is at the early stages of formation, now is the time to attend to the
infrastructure necessary to support its development.
2 BACKGROUND
Particularly with the rise of machine learning as a core technical tool for building computer systems
and the concomitant sense that these systems were not adequately reflecting the values and goals of
their designers and creators, the question of how to build values into software systems has gained
significant traction in recent years. One focal point for the community has been the rise of the FAT
scholarly meetings (FAT/ML, or the Workshop on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in
Machine Learning, held annually since 2014 at a major machine learning conference and FAT∗,
the (now, ACM) Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, which aims to build
community outside of research with a machine learning focus.2
In a similar vein, prior research within Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) and
related fields, such as Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and Science & Technology Studies,
has paid attention to the ways in which technical practices and computational artifacts of all
kinds embed or promote a range of social values (e.g., [78, 110, 137, 138, 151]). Research programs
developed to focus on values and technology, such as Value Sensitive Design and “values in design”,
include forms of both analysis to identify and critique values associated with systems, and methods
for incorporating values into the processes of engineering and design [48, 49, 78, 137]. Some of
these approaches to values have been critiqued as viewing values as overly stable and universal,
without always accounting for how values arise locally in situated environments [73, 92].
Recent research has moved away from considering values as universal and stable. Instead,
values are seen as instantiated through specific situated practices [67, 73, 92]. The conceptions
of values presented in our definitional overview reflect this tradition. Rather than argue for a
single “proper” conception of fairness, we instead use the analytic to recognize and connect the
diversity of ways these terms are defined and operationalized within different disciplinary and
professional contexts, and different communities of practice including those of law, social sciences,
humanities, and computer science. In particular, examining discussion around and representation
of values like fairness in law and policy discussions as well as in social science and technical
discussions recognizes the mutual intersections and interactions, or “knots” [71], of these seemingly
disparate fields. This builds on work by researchers who have created a range of conceptual tools
to support interdisciplinary collaboration and discussion of values, such as Shilton et al.’s values
dimensions [138], which helps researchers think about values relationally—such as where or with
whom do values reside, at what scale are values being analyzed or designed for, and so on.
A growing body of CSCW research intersects with the broader interdisciplinary community
focusing on fairness, transparency, accountability, explainability, and other values in computational
artifacts – particularly focusing on how these values come to matter in the creation, use, deployment,
and maintenance of algorithmic and machine learning systems. Indicative of this interest, recent
workshops in the CSCW community interrogate the diversity of ways in which humans (and their
values) relate to algorithmic ecosystems [150, 152]. The scope of this work ranges from empirical
analysis to design, including: critical analysis of harms such systems can cause (particularly when
2See https://fatml.org and https://fatconference.org. This area has seen explosive growth in research activity: major academic
institutions have convened cross-disciplinary scholars around this topic in events and internal study groups. Consider
New York University’s Algorithms and Accountability (http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/ili/algorithmsconference) and
Algorithms and Explanations (http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/ili/events/algorithms-and-explanations) conferences, the
Yale Information Society Project’s “Unlocking the Black Box” conference (https://law.yale.edu/isp/events/unlocking-black-
box), and UC Berkeley’s Algorithmic Opacity and Fairness Working Group (https://afog.berkeley.edu/), to present only a
few examples of strong interdisciplinary focus.
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purportedly recognizing and categorizing gender) and the violence they can perpetuate [18, 65, 75];
ethnographic investigation of how data science and algorithmic work is taught, learned, and enacted
in practice [116, 117]; user perceptions of “fairness” [94]; and methods to design algorithms while
being cognizant of stakeholder values [154].
This paper helps strengthen this interdisciplinary community by illustrating the diversity of
ways in which the concepts of values—specifically, fairness—have been promoted and maintained
in different communities. We frame our analysis, the work involved in producing it, and potential
diversity of ways it can be used through the analytical lens of infrastructures.
3 THE NEED FOR INFRASTRUCTURE
In this paper, we first turn to the analytical lens of infrastructures, before discussing how that lens
helps us develop a new piece of research infrastructure—the fairness analytic.
Star and Ruhleder’s question of “When is an infratructure?”, rather than “What is an infrastruc-
ture?,” asks researchers to pay attention to the work and practices done in the “background” that
maintain and support sociotechnical systems, [141]. A seemingly stable system–whether that be a
bridge or a “fair” algorithm–only appears stable because of the the work and practices that people
are doing to maintain and support it, which are referred to as practices of infratructuring [14]. The
practices, processes, and tools used in infrastructuring are themselves values laden and political
(e.g., who gets to make the decision about where the bridge should be built; who decides on what
conception of fairness to use?).
Reflecting diverse interests, stakeholders across the globe such as regulators, public interest
advocates, and academics are demanding that computer systems be fair, transparent, accountable,
respectful of human rights, and explainable. A growing community of engineers and computer and
information scientists, social scientists, humanities scholars are rising to the challenge. The scientific
interest in fairness, transparency, accountability, explainability, and other values in computer
science has advanced the state of theory as well as application, engaging cutting edge research in
cryptography [84], formal languages [1], and systems [63, 118]. Research by social scientists and
humanities scholars has similarly advanced the state of theory and application [5, 11, 80, 136, 149].
But like other efforts to research, and address values in an integrative fashion, members of this
community at times struggle to understand each other and it is unclear how their research outputs
can yield systems that make progress toward the values-sensitive computer systems they imagine.
The conceptual lens of infrastructures helps provide several insights into fairness. First, terms like
“fairness” that might at first glance seem stable, are only stable because people are doing work to
create and maintain a particular conceptualization of fairness (such as by publishing research papers
that define fairness in particular ways, or building systems that operationalize fairness in particular
ways). Rather than view these practices of conceptualizing fairness as being in the “background” of
designing and building systems, we can bring the practices and processes of conceptualization to
the forefront and ask how can we support the infrastructuring work of conceptualizing fairness?
The practices of processes involved in conceptualizing fairness is in part difficult and complex
because it requires sustained work across disciplines. Sustaining the cross-disciplinary collab-
orations necessary requires more than scientific interest and advances, it requires attention to
the people, processes, and tools that make “fairness” into something that multiple communities
can grapple and work with. Our interest here is in highlighting the importance and politics of
a particular component of infrastructure—a shared analytic tool for fairness that helps a diverse
research community identify and organize a research agenda and communicate their research both
within the community and to external stakeholders despite different uses of the term fairness across
disciplines and, at times, a lack of consensus within and across disciplines about what fairness
requires in a given context.
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Infrastructuring helps us see that the process of conceptualizing fairness does not just happen
on its own–there is no single, universally “natural” conception of fairness. Rather, when the term
“fairness” is used, its conceptual meaning exists because people have done social and technical work
to create and maintain a particular conceptual meaning of fairness (through writing a definition,
an equation, a line of code, and so forth). Our fairness analytic is an attempt to foreground the
infrastructuring work implicit in current fairness activities. Through the analytic’s structure, we
provide a tool that exposes the politics of conceptualizing fairness and supports interdisciplinary
engagements.
Moreover, the conceptual metaphor of infrastructure helps shed light on the “messiness” of
fairness, which we keep in mind as we develop a piece of research infrastructure—a conceptual
analytic to help discuss or think through what is meant by "fairness" across multiple conceptions
or disciplines.
3.1 A Conceptual Analytic as Research Infrastructure
Cross-disciplinary work is difficult. One noted barrier, among many, is the lack of a shared vocabu-
lary. As Paul Jeffries writes, “Ideas generated within one discipline may make perfect sense within
the discourse that they came from. However, they will be evaluated in the context of acts and
practices that do not function according to the discursive logic of the original discourse. Hence, even
though the representatives of different disciplines may be discussing a single, unambiguous topic,
their vocabularies may be very different and mutually perplexing” [46]. While divergent terms,
and use of terms, across disciplines is nothing new, it presents a formidable barrier to progress
where protection or support for the value in question is spread across the social, the legal, and the
technical.3
Terms such as “fairness” and many others represent the linguistic conflation of disparate topics
studied in different fields with different approaches, outlooks, methods and histories. Even seem-
ingly straightforward terms such as “algorithm”, “artificial intelligence”, and “machine learning”
have murky boundaries and contested histories. Existing terms come from situated and specific
disciplinary contexts, histories and norms. Advancements in the field require social scientists,
humanists, and engineers to move beyond parallel play. Tools that develop shared conversations
and allow for meaningful contestation of ambiguous terms and the politics and assumptions that
inform the various definitions at hand facilitate collaborative work by bridging disciplinary specific
vocabulary. Research at the interface of software systems and their human context (as well as
practical policy making and specifically drafting and interpreting the law) necessarily engages
concepts across disciplines. However, because scholars and practitioners in different disciplines use
the same words to mean different things, it can be challenging to advance understanding in a way
that affects research or practice in different communities [66, 87]. Instead, faced with the question of
how to describe concepts precisely, scholars and practitioners often double down on their existing
disciplinary preconceptions, believing that resorting to their particular approach to rigor will surely
convince those of different backgrounds. Moving forward requires shifts in disposition toward
other disciplines ways of seeing, as well as tools to explore the totality of approaches to seeing and
describing the concepts at issue.
Analytic tools that tease apart complex concepts and bring disciplinary specific vocabularies
that relate to them into conversation support productive engagement in at least four ways.
3Progress in the area of privacy by design has been hampered in part by the lack of conceptual and methodological tools
that bridge disciplines. A series of recent workshops held by the Computing Community Consortium trying to explore this
space document these gaps: see [25]; [24]; and [23].
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• First, the process of creating an analytic (which we present in Section 5) helps map the broad
conceptual terrain afforded by different disciplines by offering a rich perspective on the
problem and the potential solution space.
• Second, conceptual analytics reduce needless arguments caused by loose use, under-specification,
or competing definitions of terms. The community has already experienced this problem,
as we will describe below with regard to rancorous debates about whether the COMPAS
risk assessment was, or possibly could be, fair. These debates resulted in part from a lack of
clarity about how fairness was being assessed.
• Third, shared tools for analyzing ambiguous concepts allow researchers and others to un-
derstand how the insights and products of different fields relate, compare, and potentially
compose into systems. This facilitates direct collaboration among researchers from different
disciplines.
• Finally, a shared conceptual analytic plays an important political role, in two distinct ways: It
can foster political visibility—that is, attention to the very existence and political nature of
values questions being resolved by design choices [106]—of the technical choices that enact
often deeply contested values during research and system. And it also specifically protects
against simplifications designed to make complex concepts tractable as engineering or math
problems, or as being amenable to simple engineering solutions.
3.1.1 Collaboration. Vocabularies both describe and define research problems. The development
of cross-disciplinary research agendas, and the research that follows, requires conceptual linkages
across content areas which in turn depend upon tools that help a diverse community exchange
knowledge in ways that support shared reasoning about a complex subject without requiring a full
understanding of each discipline’s work.
Tools to support a common understanding or discussion of terms are particularly important
when working with concepts that are not only ambiguous within and across disciplines, but in
some instances essentially contested [51]. The terms this community is struggling collectively to
advance—such as fairness—perform important, complicated, and at times quite distinct work in
the realms of law, politics, markets, and system design [85, 106]. What is fair in one may be far
from fair in another; and even within one realm, “fair” can have multiple definitions, such as in law,
which recognizes fairness in formally the application of procedures as well as substantively in the
allocation of resources or punishments.
Opinions about what “fair” requires in a particular context are subject to heated debate, and
understanding what is fair today may not capture what is considered fair tomorrow. Nor is under-
standing what is considered fair by one stakeholder dispositive of what is considered fair by others.
For example, in relation to the concept of privacy, productive engagement with tangled, ambiguous
and essentially contested concepts requires analytic tools for mapping the arguments, disputes
and disagreements in which the concept arises [107]. Thus we believe a conceptual analytic that
teases out the dimensions of fairness (and eventually, other values) that are often essentially con-
tested concepts is necessary to support collaborative work across disciplinary specific vocabularies
around fairness in a manner that foregrounds the political, epistemological, contextual as well as
practical aspects of choosing among competing definitions. The conceptual analytic, like a shared
vocabulary, supports interdisciplinary collaborations, but importantly maintains the contested and
dynamic aspects of values by tying language choice more tightly to assumptions about the world
and knowledge production, and political commitments.
Given the multiple forms of diversity and distance represented in the research and practice
communities around fairness, as well as its inherent contested-ness, a shared tool for reasoning
may be quite useful. As with a previously proposed analytic for privacy [107], the goal of such
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an effort is not to squelch or gloss over differences in our use of concepts, but to expose them
to inquiry and facilitate the productive use of all the different concepts the respective disciplines
have to offer in a rigorous and open way. As “the sophistication of [. . .] our scientific languages, is
marked by [. . .] attunement to different possibilities of action to suit different needs and interests”
the effort to develop this analytic is pragmatic, an effort to build a tool to assist in “coordinating
our transactions with one another and our environment” [120]. Our aim is not an integration of
the disciplinary perspectives that bear on the problem, but rather a tool that helps us see the value
choices that rest in these perspectives so we can choose ones that align best with our goals. This
aligns with the tactic of “infrastructural inversion,” the surfacing of ways to organize the world
(e.g., languages) for inquiry and potential new productive re-uses [15, 16].
3.1.2 Political Visibility. Next, a shared analytic for fairness supports collaborative work across
disciplines and builds an infrastructure to maintain political visibility into technical choices [141].
Infrastructures reflect communities’ situated politics, as Star and Ruhleder argue by describing
how infrastructures come to be learned as part of membership and conventions in a community
of practice [142]. Likewise, the ways fairness becomes conceptualized and operationalized is
related to what community of practice is grappling with the term. As computer scientists begin
to address questions about values—fairness, and others—we cannot be content to allow social
science and humanities scholars simply cede the stage to engineers and lawyers or to have separate
conversations within each discipline. Responsibly advocating for the use of system design to
advance values requires attending to its politics from a perspective that attends to all disciplines,
including the potential shift in power as terms are subtly, or perhaps brazenly, redefined to suit
particular epistemologies, methods, or preconceptions. The emerging community of researchers
studying technology and values is keenly attuned to the ability of values to recede when embedded
in technological forms. A shared analytic can, we propose, allow at least experts to continue to see
and call attention to values as they are absorbed and baked into technological systems, or discarded
for practical or political reasons.
4 METHODS
While the lens of infrastructures is often used to analyze practices of the creation, maintenance,
and repair of sociotechnical systems—often through ethnographic study (e.g., [127, 143, 144])—we
take inspiration from Irani and Silberman’s call for researchers to (re)design infrastructures as part
of a constructive agenda [70]. The framing of our own work as infrastructuring put us in a more
reflective frame of mind while exploring the literatures of our respective fields.
The authors are part of several overlapping communities focused on addressing values in socio-
technical systems: three are part of a two year interdisciplinary effort at the University to specifically
explore issues of fairness and opacity in algorithmic systems; two have collaborated extensively on
research at the intersection of privacy and design; two are part of the broader multistakeholder
effort to address fairness, accountability, transparency, and explainability in machine learning
systems; and three regularly teach courses that explore values in socio-technical systems through
a multidisciplinary lens. Collectively, the authors have observed and participated in a range of
activities and venues addressing fairness in machine learning systems where they have witnessed
disagreement and confusion caused by definitional and other forms of slippage, as fairness and
other core concepts cross disciplinary boundaries. These experiences led us to understand the
urgent need for infrastructure to support greater explication of the concept of fairness–and re-
lated terms–in interdisciplinary collaborations. Thus, the purpose of our investigation was to
support interdisciplinary work within our own local communities and in the broader community
of researchers and practitioners working on fairness in machine learning systems.
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We began this task by drawing on our own varied backgrounds, culling through literature
discussing fairness (and related concepts of accountability, transparency, and explainability) in our
own disciplines and fields–applied mathematics, computer science, data science, human computer
interaction, law, statistics, and values in design. This starting point also aligned with our goal of
providing an analytic for practices related to fairness, as these fields employ fairness in relation to
some type of practice (e.g. building a system, going to trial, etc). Our research quickly snowballed
to include core philosophical texts discussing fairness which were often referenced in our disci-
plines and fields. Our goal was to use this process to surface and reflect on the range of different
meanings and usages of these terms across disciplinary groups, not to make a judgment about a
“correct” meaning, nor to provide an exhaustive review of every paper discussing fairness. Thus
we approached the literature review with a reflexive framing–documenting not just the naked
definitions proffered but the underlying assumptions and commitments they reflect. This approach
foregrounded the social and political implications of the divergent ways our respective communities
use the term fairness, and highlighted the urgent need to put these definitions of fairness more
directly in conversation and relate them to conceptions of justice. The approach also foregrounded
different epistemological orientations towards fairness, such as viewing fairness as a mathematically
achievable state, or part of continuous social justice practices, or being co-constituted by social and
institutional forces. This research also drew our attention to fundamental issues essential to the
collective research around values in systems such as the level at which we interrogate systems as
reflected in the discussion of what different communities mean when they use the terms algorithm
or system.
Through group discussion and iterative categorization and writing, we initially developed a
definitional overview of concepts, and realized that supporting interdisciplinary inquiry required a
tool that would allow the concept of fairness to be explored and debated through dimensions that
cut across disciplines. Through our process of discussion and writing, the definitional overview
of concepts evolved into an analytic to be used as a conceptual tool. Our decision to develop an
analytic was based in part on our experience with the privacy analytic by Mulligan et al. [107]—a
tool developed to support more nuanced discussions of competing conceptions of privacy, by
providing a set of cross-disciplinary dimensions of privacy rather than a set of definitions or
meanings of privacy. Through iterative group discussion, working through examples that emerged
from the literature and our experiences, and reflection on our experiences in other interdisciplinary
workshops tackling values in machine learning [42, 43, 77, 86], we refined our understanding
of what dimensions (and related questions) might ground interdisciplinary conversations and
collaborations on fairness in machine learning.
We view the fairness analytic as something that can be used throughout a values in design
or “values at play” process [45, 111], but think that it may be particularly useful during initial
exploratory phases of values discovery and identifying values-based conflicts by providing a way
to think and discuss across technical, philosophical, and empirical domain aspects of “fairness.”
5 “CONCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS” IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS
In an effort to build an infrastructure to support interdisciplinary research on building technology
that supports human values, this section presents the fruits of our research into the use of “fairness”
by different stakeholder communities. When terms that cross cultural boundaries are not available,
one alternative approach to facilitating better communication is to describe concepts as they exist
in different disciplines. Below we describe, and to some extent explore and contrast, how different
groups understand, forecast, and approach the term “fairness” when it arises as part of the work of
researchers and practitioners. The goal is to describe, clarify, and sharpen differences in the use
of the term as they appear across disciplines. Our investigation revealed how the use of the term
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“fairness” itself varies, and in particular some of the dimensions along which it varies; we have
organized these dimensions of variance into our fairness analytic (See Section 3.1). Sometimes we
find concepts and super-concepts; sometimes the use of the term between disciplines overlaps but
incompletely; and sometimes the term is used in different disciplines to address adjacent ideas
rather than the same idea. The variety of conceptions of fairness considered here exemplifies
the need for an analytic to bring these diverse vocabularies into conversation. We chose to focus
our efforts on understandings of fairness both as it is the most studied concept in this emerging
field and because it is the concept with the richest variety of conceptual approaches and which
has generated the most strident disagreements as it stands to be realized in computer systems.
However, this work draws from a larger effort to understand the variety of conceptualizations
of many terms relevant to and used in inquiries into values in computing, including “privacy”,
“accountability”, “transparency”, and “explanation”. Each of these terms, like fairness, evokes rich
concepts understood differently in different fields, and each leads to conflict over the value of
interventions depending on the disciplinary lens through which it is understood.
In describing the use of these terms by different communities, we also describe how those
communities understand contrast concepts for those terms (the concept that properly contrasts to
the specific conception of the term or which a user of a term intends to dispel by that use). Contrast
concepts negatively define the contours of the concept in question and are particularly useful in
disambiguating abstract concepts that can sensibly be broken down positively in several different
ways. We also consider whether disagreement about the meaning or scope of other terms leads to
downstream misunderstandings about the propriety or applicability of particular interventions (for
an example, see the discussion of the use of the term “algorithm” in Section 7.1).
Our discussion of terminology provides the opportunity to consider the frontier of research on
the core topic of fairness as it is represented in this definitional overview, contrasting different
approaches to its operationalization according to the views of different possible viewers and
stakeholders. For example, we discuss the forefront of research in machine learning fairness,
viewed through the lens of how the term “fairness” is used by computer scientists, practicing
lawyers, law scholars, social scientists, philosophers, and others. This discussion allows us to
suggest approaches to bridging the gaps between these constructs and highlights opportunities
for each community to make use of the work being done by scholars and practitioners in other
communities.
Fairness is a deep subject addressed by an enormous literature spanning thousands of years
and many disciplines. Philosophers, lawyers, and humanists of all stripes consider fairness in
terms of morality and dignity, though also in terms of process and allocation. Policies and laws
designed to protect individuals and groups from discrimination or mistreatment tend to focus
on proscribing behaviors, biases, and basing decisions on certain protected factors—in this last
sense, antidiscrimination laws share a kinship with privacy laws, in that both seek to eliminate the
spread or influence of certain sensitive information and serve to protect dignitary interests. Social
scientists often consider fairness in light of social relationships, power dynamics, institutions, and
markets. Here, there is an emphasis on the constructed nature both of perceptions of fairness and
on the factors which might affect unfairness or discrimination. Finally, quantitative fields have
studied questions of fair allocation as pure mathematical problems, through the design of market
or voting mechanisms for eliciting outcomes that appear fair, and in the sorts of statistical and
machine learning models which have triggered renewed interest in the values implications of
software technology.
5.0.1 The Philosophy of Fairness. Ideas about fairness often rest intuitively on the sense that what
is fair is also what is morally right, especially as something which is not morally right is likely
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also not fair for some actor. We provide here a brief and necessarily incomplete overview of the
philosophical underpinnings of these ideas. A more detailed treatment, not undertaken here, would
relate the conceptions of fairness articulated here to ideas about operationalizing fairness in specific
ways in technical systems, as we describe below.
Theories of morality and ethics are often broken down by whether they consider a need for
“doing the right thing” to stem from virtues, duties and rules, or consequences. Virtue ethics is the
ancient discipline of moral analysis based on virtues—deep-seated traits of character which make
the person who has them morally good. In the frame of virtue ethics, fairness is simply a virtue,
to be perfected by practice and learning, and embodied in a moral agent. This notion of fairness
undergirds the idea that properly designed technologies can be sufficiently virtuously behaved
as to be fair in a given application. Nussbaum examines virtue ethics as presented by the Greek
philosophers, finding that a focus on virtues leaves open the possibility that external factors can
compromise virtues and suggesting reason as a necessary component of realizing virtue in human
flourishing [113]. She has also questioned whether virtues constitute a separate category for the
basis of ethics than duties [114].
Much of deontological ethics—that is, ethics based on the duty to uphold given rules—passes
through the work of Immanuel Kant to modern philosophers [82, 83]. Kant argues for upholding
the categorical imperative, a rule which defines behavior as moral if it is consistent with a world
in which everyone takes up that behavior. Fairness derives from duty in this frame, attaching
moral valence to an action by demanding that what fairness requires is embodied in a duty, and
what is unfair constitutes a breach of this duty. This notion of fairness is a basis for legal notions
of fairness, which often proscribe specific types of unfairness or assign a duty to uphold certain
requirements or to perform certain actions to a specific actor. Schopenhauer critiques this reliance
on duty, however, rooting morality in the virtue of compassion rather than in the cold and dead
rote application of a rule [134].
Finally, consequentialism defines morality in terms of the consequences of certain actions [139].
The most straightforward operationalization of this comes in the form of utilitarianism, an approach
to assigning moral valence to actions straightforwardly by calculating the total amount of good
and bad in the consequences of those actions [7, 101]. The net good—the total amount of good
(for all people) minus the total amount of bad (for all people)—for a morally right action must
then be greater than the net good for any other available action. Classic utilitarianism differs
from deontological ideas about morality because it denies that anything matters in assessing the
morality of an action other than the consequences. Fairness derives from the setting of the utilitarian
view: if an action maximizes the overall good, it must of necessity be the most fair action, since it
would be unfair to someone to take another action (because in that scenario, that person would
receive less good and would thus be treated unfairly). Utilitarianism underlies many technological
operationalizations of fairness, which function by counting up the good (say, correct outputs of a
software scoring system) and balancing it in some way against the bad (say, erroneous outputs of
that same system). For an example of this and how it trades off with other ideas about fairness, see
Section 7.
Political philosophy has also engaged questions of fairness as a matter of social and societal
organization. Rawls, for example, defines notions of distributive justice and equity as fair when
they are independent of one’s place in society, subject to the “difference principle” that deviations
from strict equality are acceptable to the extent they make the least advantaged better off than they
would be in a world of strict equality [125]. Rawls refines this framing to the idea of “justice as
fairness” [124]. Therefore, the only societies which are fair are those we would choose to live in
(or contract for with others) absent knowledge of our position within them, restricting analysis to
behind a “veil of ignorance”.
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Another approach articulates the concept of “luck egalitarianism”, the idea that factors which
are left up to chance should not (in a normative sense) interfere with one’s access to a fair set of
opportunities in society. That is, a fair society is one in which outcomes are based on the responsible
choices people make, not on uncontrolled aspects of their circumstances. While this theory is not
in conflict with Rawls’ justice as fairness [146], it has been critiqued by Anderson, who notes that
the goal of political fairness should be ending socially imposed oppression, not eliminating the
effects of “brute luck” [2]. Many software systems are designed to treat all subjects in procedurally
equal ways, so the question of how the luck of ability and situation of those subjects relates to that
treatment is relevant to interrogations of the fairness of the technical artifact.
Other philosophers have viewed fairness in the context of notions of general agreement, viewing
right and wrong as subject to agreement at the societal level or at the individual level (possibly
subject to assent for that agreement at the societal level). These contractual notions of right and
wrong bear some unpacking for our purposes, as they vest the question of what is moral and
fair in agreements among affected and unaffected people. Social contract theory has its roots in
Hobbes, who begins with the fundamental self-interest of individuals [64] and argues that it is most
beneficial for this self interest to form agreements about moral norms. Government power, then,
and the normative force of laws and morals, both stem from the consent of those agreeing to be
bound by them, who do so because it is in their interest to make such arrangements. Rousseau [128],
also argues that the sovereign power of society stems from the willingness of its participants to
give up natural freedoms for equally burdensome laws and duties. However, Rousseau argues that
this agreement stems from the fact that rationality requires respect for persons, and that mutual
respect must form the basis for the contents of the social contract. Ideas about social contracts are
often subdivided along these lines, with ideas grounded in Hobbes’ view falling under the banner of
contractarianism and ideas stemming from Rousseau under the banner of contractualism. Scanlon, a
key modern contractualist, explicitly relates fairness to the construction of social contracts, noting
that we can consider fairness in terms of the effects it has on others we interact with [132]. He also
argues that human rights matter only insofar as the consequences of having those rights can be
articulated and experienced [133]. Social contract theory helps when analyzing values in software
systems, as it speaks to what is necessary to make outcomes mediated by those systems legitimate
embodiments of those values. The language of contractarianism also arises often in discussions of
the purported benefits and costs of technology adoption, which is based on the interests of those
involved as weighed against the interests of others.
Another approach to breaking down ideas of fairness in philosophy is based on the operative
concept of justice served by that moral theory. Many of the key debates about what fairness means
or what it entails happen within these frames, and several distinctions apply [112]. Rawls and
Scanlon both view fairness through the lens of distributed substantive justice, focusing on how
to allocate resources in a society or sphere of social or political life.Those allocations may vary
(and the variance be ascribed moral rectitude) based on whether and to what extent attributes of
individuals (both within their control and outside it) should inform distributions; whether need, or
effort, or merit, or societal contribution should serve as the basis for distribution; and even what
is to be distributed resources or opportunities. Justice and fairness in this framing both serve to
respect and to support human dignity. Others operationalize justice in a procedural mode rather
than a substantive one, focusing on the extent to which procedures apply equally to all, or consider
justice as corrective, applying remedially when one person interferes with another’s allocations
rather than as a principle for understanding the correct allocation of distributable goods and
positions within society. Beitz, for example, understands political fairness as a “normative property
of institutions and procedures” [6], though his view considers fairness at the level of political
agency in shaping those institutions and procedures rather than requiring that the institutions
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and procedures themselves be fair. Broome describes fairness as embodied in the process of a
lottery, explaining why lottery allocation matches intuitive ideas about fairness [17]. Ryan rejects
the notion of contractualized fairness and fairness as a property of institutions and procedures in
summarizing several schools of thought on fairness in political philosophy [129]. Hellman draws
distinctions between fairness and justice in understanding the underpinnings of why discrimination
is a moral harm [62].
Legal philosophers are more engaged with the question of how to embody fairness in law. Hart’s
foundational positivist work frames laws as rules constructed by humans, without regard to whether
those rules in fact capture morality [61]. Dworkin, by contrast, argues that human rights exist
outside the written law and that the law can be superceded by such interests [39]. Many of the
same debates take place when considering fairness as embodied in a technical artifact: to what
extent are the rules constructed of the artifact itself vs. deriving from an absolute notion of right
and wrong?
5.0.2 Unfairness and Discrimination. Understandings of fairness can be further interrogating
through exploration of contrast concepts, or concepts that are placed in opposition to fairness
[107]. By examining what is explicitly seen as not fair, we can better understand what “fairness” is
deployed to achieve and better understand its scope and limits. Contrast concepts to fairness include
unfairness and discrimination. In law, there are frameworks via equal protection laws to address and
minimize unfairness and discrimination. Disputes over the concept of equal protection illustrate
divergent perspectives on fairness. Does equality before the law demand recognition of existing
racism and allow actions to remedy it, or demand "color blindness"? For example, compare, the
majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,4 which upholds, under a strict scrutiny analysis, affirmative
action in law school admissions) with the opinion of Justice Thomas, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, which argues that the equal protection clause prohibits such affirmative action
because it classifies on the basis of race.
U.S. equal protection laws vary by sector, including the Fair Housing Act (prohibiting discrimi-
nation in housing decisions), the Americans with Disabilities Acts (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of covered disabilities), or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (prohibiting employment discrimination) but share a focus on limiting the impact
of protected characteristics–race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability–on significant life
opportunities.
“Disparate Impact” and “Disparate Treatment” are considered forms of unfair discrimination;
to prove that one of these equal protection laws has been violated, plaintiffs must show that they
have faced one of these forms of discrimination.
Disparate treatment occurs “when people are treated differently on the basis of a protected
characteristic” [12]. In U.S. law, these protected characteristics include race, color, sex or gender,
religion, age, disability status, national origin, and marital status. For instance, a decision about
providing credit to someone cannot be made because of one’s marital status—even if there were
data that suggested that marital status is correlated with one’s credit score.
Disparate impact “occurs when a company employs facially neutral policies or practices that
have a disproportionate adverse effect or impact on a protected class, unless those practices or
policies further a legitimate business need that cannot reasonably be achieved by means that have
less disparate an impact.” [44].
For instance, making decisions about credit decisions based on consumers’ ZIP codes could
potentially have a disparate impact on an ethnic group, as some ethnic groups are concentrated in
particular ZIP codes and geographic areas [44]. In both cases, there are particular legally protected
4539 U.S. 306, 327–41 (2003)
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characteristics or protected classes that the law has identified as needing specific protections from
unfair discrimination in various domains, including housing, employment, and access to financial
credit.
Due Process In the context of decision making about individuals the term fairness also applies to
process. Due process imposes procedural constraints on government actions that are measured by
fairness, as well as risk of erroneous deprivation, the seriousness of those risks, and the costs of
providing more process.5 For decision making processes to be considered fair they must support
participation by subjects–for example providing them with access to the data and logic being
used to render decisions, as well as opportunities to correct or challenge them–and additionally
protect dignitary interests that provide for a voice in legal proceedings or require human oversight
over technological processes. When protected interests are involved hearings which provide
opportunities for an individual to participate, understand evidence, and shape outcomes are an
important component of fairness. This concept of fairness is captured in data protection law as
well, such as in the European General Data Protection Regulation. Both data protection and general
due process attend to fair decision-making processes.
5.0.3 Fairness and Society. Questions of fairness are often viewed empirically, situated within
society. Such questions are the general purview of social scientists, who have developed relevant
approaches to analyzing fairness and discrimination. For example, while decision policies can be
disparate in their direct treatment of individuals or inadvertently in their impact, neither fully
reaches the idea that the opportunities available to individuals may be constructed of their position
in society [119]. Further, critical scholars of race have noted the tendency of advantages to accrue to
members of certain groups under the heading of privilege [95, 99]. In particular, if one subscribes to
a constructivist theory of the attributes that define membership in privileged and underprivileged
groups, it seems inherently problematic to consider these factors as “attributes” [80] Similarly the
concept of intersectionality, which identifies the ways that race, class and gender are mutually
constitutive and interact in lived experiences of oppression [34], is at odds with such an atomistic
approach. Race, as a social construct cannot be viewed as a bit or variable that can be removed or
controlled in an analysis, but rather shifts the gaze to the myriad ways in which racism is reflected
in data collection and other social practices and the systems of classification that use and support
them.
5.0.4 Quantitative Notions of Fairness. In addition to qualitative aspects deriving from ideas about
morality and ethics, fairness as a matter of equal or equitable allocation has a long history of study
in mathematical fields. Technical definitions of fairness are manifold, and can be substantially
different to one another. Within quantitative fields such as mathematics, computer science, statistics,
and economics, fairness criteria are generally defined with respect to a specific task or problem.
We explore three problems where quantitative approaches to fairness have been considered: fair
division, voting, and fair machine learning.6
Fair Division. The simplest fair allocation problem is that of fair division, or “cake cutting”: if
one has some resource (“cake”), how would one best allocate that resource (“cut”) according to
5Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
6This leaves aside other interesting problems of fair resource allocation in computer science (e.g. process scheduling,
network throughput, disk allocation) where “fair” generally means “in equal portions” or “in proportion to the amount
requested” or “available within a reasonable amount of time”. In these problems, interesting distinctions come via questions
of the unit of analysis: are equal resources provided to low-level primitives (e.g., processes, network flows) or to particular
logical abstractions (users, groups, network endpoints)? That is not to say that there are not rich questions of fairness to be
had even in this simpler arena; network traffic discrimination and the allocation of bandwidth are often the subject of both
contractual and political constraints (for example, under the banner of “network neutrality” [153]).
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some definition of utility, the benefit accrued from each allocation? In an interactive setting, each
party is incentivized to maximize a fair version of utility in a “cut-and-choose” protocol, where
one party proposes an allocation and another proposes the assignment of shares to parties. Such
allocations satisfy the condition that they are envy-free, meaning that no party should prefer the
shares given to another party, on the basis of the separation of allocation and assignment. Fair
division protocols can have other goals, such as proportionality (the property that each participant
receives a share at least as large as their fraction of the parties) and equitablilty (the property that
each participant derives equal utility from their share) [121].
Lee and Baykal observe that “optimally fair” allocations determined mathematically based on
expressions of utility may not be preferable to negotiated allocations for various reasons [94]. This
suggests that people do a poor job expressing their utility mathematically or that the dignitary
interest served by negotiation strengthens the perceived fairness of outcomes. This suggests that
mathematical notions of fairness in the allocation of resources may be insufficient on their own to
achieve fairness (or even the perception of fairness) in sociotechnical systems.
Voting. Fairness has also received much attention in the voting literature, a part of game theory
in which voting is a mechanism where every participant’s preferences are collected (in ballots)
and then those preferences are combined into a outcome. Outcomes can take many forms: a single
winner, a collection of winners, or a socially-aggregated ranked list, or even no winner. Various
intuitive notions of fairness cannot be achieved by many voting mechanisms, as shown through the
plethora of impossibility results in this space for both deterministic [4, 53, 131] and randomized [81]
schemes. Such desiderata include equality (the votes of all voters are treated the same), neutrality
(all candidates on a ballot are treated the same), monotonicity (if candidate A is already the winner, a
hypothetical transfer of votes from B to Amaintains A as the winner), unanimity (if everyone prefers
candidate A over B, then the voting system should rank A above B as well), non-dictatorial (the
voting system is not responsive to the vote of a single individual in all cases), and non-imposition
(a path exists for every candidate to win). Sometimes, changes in the setting or assumptions can
circumvent these impossibility results [98, 105]. In general, however, voting as a pure mechanism
also suffers in terms of its ability to capture broader ideas about fairness.
Fair Machine Learning. Recent attention to the use of machine learning in socially critical
applications has focused research energies on the problems of fairness in machine learning and
statistical models more generally [58]. Machine learning researchers have operationalized demands
that systems treat people fairly with respect to sensitive attributes (e.g., gender, race, etc.) in many
ways, grouped broadly into two categories: individual fairness (i.e., treating like cases alike) [38]; and
group fairness (i.e., treating groups—often defined by legally protected attributes—in a way that is
somehow equal or equitable, such as by matching various statistics across groups) [60, 103, 104, 108].
Both ideas stand in contrast to an intuitive notion of fairness through blindness, the idea that simply
removing attributes on the basis of which one does not wish to make predictions from the data
upon which models are built will eliminate its effect from the model. Blindness fails for many
reasons, notably because it does not in fact, on its own, remove the impact of the data being blinded,
which may be redundantly encoded in other factors. As such, Lipton, Chouldechova, and McAuley
have suggested that fixing disparities in impact may inherently require creating disparities in
treatment [97]. Indeed, in cases where the attribute one desires to suppress is socially constructed,
it may not be meaningful without this proxy information [80].
Individual fairness requires similar people are treated similarly by the classification mechanism.
But this approach requires knowing how to measure how “similar” two individuals are, at least for
the purpose of the particular task to which machine learning is being deployed. Further, the fact that
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similar individuals are treated similarly does not address the question of whether that treatment is
equitable or justified, both key components of fairness as conceptualized philosophically.
Group fairness can be formulated in many ways as well. Perhaps the simplest group fairness
criterion to state and themost natural measure for which to strive is demographic parity, the property
that the acceptance rate of an algorithm (that is, the fraction of inputs which receive a positive
classification) should be the same for subgroups across all values of a particular sensitive attribute
(e.g., the same fraction of white and black internet users see a particular ad). Mathematically, this
is equivalent to the outcome being statistically independent from the sensitive attribute (i.e. the
chance of seeing the ad does not depend on race). On the surface, demographic parity is attractive
because it describes a world in which decisions truly do not depend on attributes considered
sensitive.
Not all statistical fairness criteria are created equal, and none fully captures the richness with
which fairness is conceptualized in other fields. If proper care is not taken in the operationalization of
such criteria, systems may still exhibit undesired behavior [58]. For example, although demographic
parity seems innocuous and even a desireable criterion on the surface, it suffers from serious
design flaws. Since demographic parity only asks that the acceptance rate across subgroups be the
same, without specifying how this be achieved, we could satisfy this requirement in a perverse
manner. Suppose a certain model has an 80% acceptance rate for men. We can enforce demographic
parity as follows: for women, simply pick a number from 1—10 uniformly at random; if the value
is 9 or 10, we reject the woman; otherwise, we accept them. In this case, the acceptance rate for
women matches that of men at 80%. However, the mechanism does not use any of the subject’s
characteristics to make its decision. Though we have achieved demographic parity, we have created
a situation that seems unfair in other ways—applying a different and arbitrary rule for women vs.
men.
Even if we demand that the rules for each group be sensible, demographic parity fails to cap-
ture information about which members of a group should receive any given outcome (so, in the
advertising example above, a system could show the ad only to white users who are interested in
or qualified for the product or service advertised and only to minority users who are not interested
or qualified or who simply cannot afford the good or service on offer—so an ad “shown equally”
across groups may still lead to disparate real-world outcomes because members of each group
respond to it differently). Still, demographic parity remains a seductively straightforward demand
for fairness. It is likely better described as an ideal: in a fairer world where opportunities in fact did
not depend on protected status attributes, demographic parity would occur naturally. However,
given that opportunities are distributed disparately and unequally in the real world, such a demand
is generally over-restrictive for real decision systems while still allowing for significant unfairness.
To capture more expressive ideas of fairness in statistical definitions, other criteria have been
proposed based on notions of statistical parity: explicitly demanding equalized error rates amongst
groups, at the cost of further constraining model behavior and possibly reducing overall accuracy.
Other proposed metrics include equalized odds [60], equalizing the chance that a member of each
group be accepted conditioned on that member’s true condition (e.g., selecting the same fraction
of black borrowers and white borrowers who will actually pay back a loan) and predictive value
parity [19], which equalizes positive or negative predictive value, a statistic which represents the
chance that positive or negative predictions are in fact accurate (that is, the predictive value of the
classifier for membership in the positive or negative class).7
7For an overview of many available statistical fairness measures, see several tutorials at major machine learning research
conferences [13, 57, 108] as well as excellent summaries in [103, 104, 148]. Finally, an online book-in-progress presents a
more complete case around measures of discrimination [58].
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Somewhat pessimistically, statistical fairness research is riddled with impossibility results. That
is, in the context of a particular task, it is in general impossible to construct an algorithm that
satisfies all of the above-described fairness criteria [19, 76]. Conceptually speaking, something has
to give: considerations of fairness inherently pit different equities against each other and fairness
is often described as essentially contested [51]. Purely mathematical intuition suggests that placing
additional restrictions on the behavior of an algorithm for a particular use can only limit the set
of remaining acceptable algorithms for that application. Demanding that an algorithm to satisfy
too many fairness criteria can restrict the class of potential algorithms so much that it implies no
solution to the problem at hand.
Stepping away from mathematical technicalities, Jacobs and Wallach have argued that issues in
fair machine learning come from a more fundamental source, namely the failure to attend to issues
of measurement and construct validity in models [72]. Construct validity is a literature from statistics
that evaluates models not only based on their predictive capacity but on their structure [100, 122].
Alternatively, Kusner et al. have argued that fairness in machine learning model outputs can
be understood counterfactually in terms of how the inputs can be modulated to achieve different
outcomes [88]. This leads into the idea of strategically manipulating one’s attributes in order to get
the most desirable output from a model and the related question of how to build a model to resist
such gaming [59]. Notably, strategic behavior may have disparate effects (as individuals may have
disparate access to the instruments of manipulation) [68] or broader social losses [102]. Economists
have long noted that such strategic behavior can cause statistical relationships to break down and
be arbitraged away through the phenomenon of Goodhart’s law [55].
In our discussion of quantitative notions of fairness, the fairness criteria proposed are more akin
to specific measures of types of unfairness one would hope a reasonable system does not exhibit
than they are to holistic concepts of fairness. Indeed, it is perhaps best to think of such criteria
not as specifications of fairness, but as operationalizations of criteria it may be unreasonable to
violate. This is underscored bymathematical impossibility results and the observation that fairness is
essentially contested, both of which imply the necessity of tradeoffs and the lack of any truly neutral
design choices. Mathematical fairness criteria should not be confused with sufficient conditions for
fairness—these criteria aim to protect a particular harm or injustice. Indeed, impossibility results
tell us that some of these criteria must be violated in any interesting application. In particular cases,
however, certain of these conditions may be necessary to achieve fairness; certainly, they provide
useful and technologically sound approaches to breaking down fairness problems—the question is
when and how to apply which ones.
6 FAIRNESS ANALYTIC
The wide ranging meanings of fairness detailed above presents challenges to collaboration, but
also presents opportunities for deeper exploration of what fairness could and should mean in
various sociotechnical systems. Working productively amidst the wealth of definitions however
requires tools to bring them into conversation and enable researchers from different disciplines
to work fluidly across and among them. This counsels against rigid definitions and towards a
tool that allows researchers to reflexively explore various conceptions of fairness both within and
across communities. For these reasons, we chose to develop a conceptual analytic that highlights
specific dimensions along which various definitions of fairness described above can be considered.
The Fairness Analytic allows researchers to bring the definitions into conversation from different
vantage points.
The Fairness Analytic can be found in Appendix A and contains six overarching dimensions:
theory, relationship to society, unfairness, protection, provision, and context along which con-
ceptions of fairness can be unpacked. Our claim is that analytically separating these overarching
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dimensions can clarify the function and value of fairness in practice. Dimensions of theory help
focus collaborators on the purpose and justifications of fairness, politically important yet often
underspecified in discussions and arguments about the design of computer systems. Relationship
to society supports clarification of important connections between concepts of fairness and justice,
as well as the bounds of the system or sociotechnical system under scrutiny. Dimensions of con-
text further bound fairness to domains, time-frames, and ideas about measurement. Dimensions
of unfairness supports elaboration on what and who is considered capable of violation fairness,
often significant considerations in the design of sociotechnical systems. Finally, the dimensions
of protection and provision help clarify both more specifically what fairness is sought to provide,
whom it is to protect, and where such protection can be operationalized.
Belowwe describe and explore the dimensions and sub-dimensionsmore fully through application
to a case study.
7 CASE STUDY: DEBATING THE FAIRNESS OF CRIMINAL RISK ASSESSMENTS
The community that works with values in computer systems is familiar with the challenges posed
by communicating across disciplines. A shared infrastructure, including but not limited to a shared
framework (such as that provided by our analytic) for describing, comparing, and contesting values
such as fairness, is particularly important to support the analysis and design of real world systems
in settings with significant values-oriented issues.
A sharp example of where a framework for organizing discussion across stakeholder groups and
disciplinary approaches around fairness in the application of computer systems in the real world
comes from public debates about the recidivism risk assessment systems—tools used to predict
an individual’s risk of engaging in future crimes, proxied by their likelihood of re-arrest, in the
context of criminal justice decisions such as those concerning arrest, bail, parole, or sentencing.
Debates about fairness within such systems clearly demonstrate the confusion stemming from
different conceptions of “fairness”. Legislatures have moved aggressively to require the use of
risk scoring in some contexts [91, 115], particularly at sentencing as an effort to improve fairness
and the overall management of criminal justice.8 From their perspective risk assessment tools
promise to provide an “objective” assessment of an individual’s criminal risk. Concerned with the
unfairness that results from human bias, legislatures have sought to use these tools because—as
algorithms—they don’t suffer from latent human biases that plague judges, such as outgroup bias,
availability heuristics, confirmation bias, and other cognitive biases and phenomena. They viewed
this as a move to increase the fairness of bail or jail outcomes by reducing a known source of
unequal treatment based on perceptions of the accused’s race. Many communities (including the
research and advocacy communities) have, however, adopted a range of perspectives from seeing
the tools as a positive addition to the criminal justice toolkit [8, 47], to tools that trade off different
ideas about fairness that therefore require careful governance [9, 115], to risky tools with the
potential to mislead judges [56] or overcomplexify simple relationships [37].
The fairness of the criminal recidivism risk assessment tool COMPAS (developed by Northpointe,
Inc.), as applied to the assessment of pre-trial sanctions, has been the subject of heated public debate,
litigation, and discussion and research in several communities.9 Much ink has been spilt detailing
and arguing about the system (e.g., [3, 9, 19, 29, 30, 36, 37, 47, 54, 56, 76, 115]). Our discussion here
is limited, aimed at showing the way in which different, and often under-specified, conceptions of
“fairness”—along with variations in how “the system” was defined—complicated the conversation,
8One effort, California’s SB 10, pairs the criminal justice reform goal of eliminating money bail with a requirement for
procuring and using risk assessment tools, but its implementation has been stalled by a recall of the law.
9The use of COMPAS in other contexts, such as at sentencing, has also been subject to much of the same technical criticism
and also litigation in multiple states [91].
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and limited the generative potential of the disagreement, for example to clarify areas of consensus
and disagreement about facts, assumptions, and desirable end states. Informed by our exploration
of conceptions of fairness, organized into the fairness analytic, below we explore the COMPAS
debates to highlight the potential benefit of cross-disciplinary understanding.
7.1 “Algorithms” and the unit of analysis
Determining the appropriate unit of analysis or level of abstraction at which to engage questions
about COMPAS is its own challenge. We give a brief aside about the meaning of the seemingly
uncontested term “algorithm”, in order to highlight the depth at which terminological confusion and
lack of a shared vocabulary governs discussion of real cases. As with the more abstract term fairness
we consider in Section 5, the term “algorithm” is assigned disparate meaning in the literatures of
computer science and other fields, and is even contested within computer science. For example,
Donald Knuth defined algorithms as separate from mathematical formulae in that they must: (i.)
“always terminate after a finite number of steps”, (ii.) that “each step must be precisely defined; the
actions to be carried out must be rigorously and unambiguously specified for each case”, (iii.) that
input is “quantities which are given to it initially before the algorithm begins”, (iv.) that output is
“quantities which have a specified relation to the inputs”, and (v.) that “all of the operations to be
performed in the algorithm must be sufficiently basic that they can in principle be done exactly
and in a finite length of time by a man using paper and pencil” [79]. Similarly and more simply,
in their widely used textbook, Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest and Stein define an algorithm as “any
well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces
some value, or set of values as output” [31]. Algorithms may be fully deterministic, mapping inputs
to outputs as a mathematical function, or they may be randomized, mapping inputs to probability
distributions of possible outputs, meaning the values may relate to the inputs only probabilistically.
These definitions are precise, clear, and scoped only to technical artifacts, though they differ in
specificity somewhat.
By contrast, communications scholar Christian Sandvig says that “‘algorithm’ refers to the overall
process” by which some human actor uses a computer to do something, including decisions taken
by humans as to what the computer should do, choices made during implementation, and even
choices about how algorithms are represented and marketed to the public [130]. Sandvig argues that
even algorithms as simple as sorting “have their own public relations” and are inherently human
in their decisions. Another communications scholar, Nicholas Diakopoulos, defines algorithms
in the narrow sense (“as a series of steps undertaken in order to solve a particular problem or
accomplish a defined outcome”) but considers them in the broad sense (saying “algorithms can
arguably make mistakes and operate with biases”, which does not make sense for the narrower
technical definition) [35].
Science and Technology Studies scholar Malte Ziewitz asks whether we can examine algorithms
“as a figure that ismobilized by both practitioners and analysts?” [155]. Similarly, anthropologist Nick
Seaver argues that algorithms are cultural objects situated in sociotechnical systems, constructed
as much socially as technically [135].
Technologists prefer to think only of the characteristics of their well-defined tools, scoped to and
embodied within machines; by contrast, fields outside of computer science use the term “algorithm”
to mean a full sociotechnical system that includes people and culture, not only a technical artifact.
There is an important gap in understanding between these views: if we wish to interrogate whether
the application of an algorithm is “fair”, we must first understand if we are considering the fairness
only of the technical tool itself or if our analysis must also cover the tool’s context and interactions
with people and society. Even if considering only the technical tool the competing conceptions of
algorithms discussed above presents challenges communication and collaboration across disciplines.
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Clearly defining the unit of analysis sets the terms of the debate and also structures the nature of
research questions. For example, unfairness is often situated by technologists outside mathematical
or technical artifacts but rather in the data fed into them or some other aspect of how they
interact with society, preserving a notion of “technological neutrality” by rescoping the analysis.
Yet decisions about when and how to deploy which pieces of technology in which ways themselves
have politics and can be arguably judged as more or less fair.
7.2 COMPAS: An unfair algorithm?
In May of 2016, the investigative journalism organization ProPublica released the results of their
study of the criminal recidivism risk assessment tool, COMPAS, as it is deployed and used in
Broward County, Florida [3]. The study revealed a startling bias in the tool’s false-positive rates:
black arrestees who would not be re-arrested in a two-year horizon were nonetheless scored into
a “high-risk” category at nearly twice the rate of white arrestees who were not subsequently
arrested [3]. The journalists argued that this bias made the use of COMPAS unfair to black people.
This makes intuitive sense as it appeals to fairness properties such as treating likes alike, and
objecting to rules that, while facially neutral, produce disparate impacts along protected class status.
ProPublica claimed that assigning extra risk to certain people based only on their race was unfair.
The assessment’s vendor, Northpointe (now, equivant), responded by asserting that COMPAS
was, in fact, fair [36], as the scores are designed to define relative levels of risk (such that any score,
say “4 out of 10”, corresponds to the same risk of re-arrest regardless of race). This also appeals to
intuitive concepts of fairness in government decision-making, such as treating all citizens according
to the same rules and demanding that bureaucratic assessments be accurate representations of
the world. After all, because the rate at which blacks are arrested in Broward County is nearly
twice as high as the rate at which whites are arrested [3], satisfying the fairness criterion suggested
in the ProPublica study would require that scores have different interpretations for whites and
blacks [19].
In a world where black people are arrested more often, a score that predicts the risk of arrest
must be higher for black people. If it were not, then the same score would imply a different risk
level for similarly situated white and black arrestees. To remedy this, either the scores could be
altered such that black people would receive lower scores than whites with similar attributes in
some cases (thereby treating similar cases differently), or the cutoff points could be altered, so that
the perceived risk associated to a particular score would differ by race (for example, by setting
the cutoff for a “high risk” designation higher for blacks than for whites). Academics later pointed
out that the demands of Northpointe and ProPublica—that scores correspond equally to risk for
both whites and blacks, and that scores falsely create high-risk designations for whites and blacks
at equal rates, which both seem necessary for the system to be fair—are mutually incompatible
at a mathematical level [19, 29, 76]. That is, ProPublica and Northpointe disagreed not on the
performance of the tool or even the correct construction of the tool, but rather on what “fairness”
requires in criminal justice applications. This is not to say that either realization of “fairness” is
correct or even to compare their moral weight; rather, each approach to operationalizing fairness
in this context serves a particular stakeholder’s interests.
All of these arguments considered the fairness of the system at a particular level of abstraction.
They focused on the inputs, outputs, and structure of the COMPAS tool itself, rather than its
integration into the system of making pretrial decisions about bail and release, sentencing, or
correctional offender management. Yet the mathematical incompatability of operationalizations of
fairness in this setting suggests that analysis might better be directed at the broader process. The
criminal justice system has an important due process interest in protecting the calibration of scores
to measured re-arrest risk, so that scores can be interpreted by judges effectively [56]. Arrestees,
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on the other hand, have a strong interest in minimizing the false-positive rate for high-risk ratings,
as well as in equalizing that rate across demographics [28]. For both groups, however, the goal of
reliably administering justice and minimizing the risk of failure to appear could be served instead
by other behavioral interventions, such as messages reminding people of their court dates [26].
7.3 Human vs. Machine Bias
The turn to recidivism risk prediction was contested on the basis of the purported fairness of
the algorithm itself, yet its adoption was driven by concerns with the fairness of the system at a
higher level of abstraction. Given research showing that judges decision making can be affected
by inappropriate factors [123], some suggest risk assessment as a tool to limit such bias. Yet, as
described above, the data used to create these risk assessments is historically situated within racially
biased policing practices, and may not reflect true risk levels. However, even setting aside concerns
about biases in the data, how such tools interact with existing work practices is unclear and an
area of active research [52, 145]. Ethnographic research by Angele Christin suggests that like other
tools that are introduced into the workplace, the introduction of risk recidivism tools has met
with resistance [21]. Her work suggests that at least part of that resistance is based on ideas about
fairness. Christin shares a quote from a senior judge she interviewed about analytic tools:
I don’t look at the numbers. There are things you can’t quantify [. . .] You can take
the same case, with the same defendant, the same criminal record, the same judge, the
same attorney, the same prosecutor, and get two different decisions in different courts.
Or you can take the same case, with the same defendant, the same judge, etc., at a
two-week interval and have completely different decision. Is that justice? I think it is.
Similarly, Christin found that probation officers engaged in “criteria tinkering.” They would
“manipulate the variables they entered in risk-assessment tools in order to obtain the score that
they thought was adequate for a given defendant” [21]. Finally some of Christin’s interview data
suggests that the push back against the system was based in a lack of understanding of how it
worked, and a lack of trust. For example, a former prosecutor explaining why he did not “put much
stock” in risk assessment tools said, “I’d prefer to look at actual behaviors. I just didn’t know how
these tests were administered, in which circumstances, with what kind of data [. . .] With these tools
the output is only as good as the input. And the input is controversial” [21]. Overall, she concluded
that legal professionals “openly contest the data and methods used to build risk-assessment tools,
which they characterize as “crude” and “problematic,” and criticize the for-profit companies who
designed them. She found that legal professionals questioned why they should follow a completely
opaque model over their own professional judgment, noting that “legal professionals do not see
the point. For better or worse, they trust their own judgment instead.” [21].
These findings suggest that the vision of fairness captured within the COMPAS system does not
in any straightforward way tell us something about the fairness of the process as a whole. The
tension between the legislature’s desire for some data-driven objectivity to advance fairness and
the judges’ and bailiffs’ sense of the contextual and situational analysis required to advance justice
reveals the extent and depth of contests about what fairness requires in practice.10 It also highlights
the limitations of focusing exclusively on the outputs of the COMPAS system if what we actually
care about is the fairness of the pretrial or sentencing processes as a whole.
Whether deploying risk assessments is fair will depend on how we define fairness, the level of
abstraction at which we attempt to analyze it, and the particularities of how the assessments are
integrated into the criminal justice system. In the context of the debate around COMPAS, the focus
10Lab experiments find that achieving outcomes perceived as fair requires discussion, not just the establishment of a priori
preferences and rules. See [94].
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has, for better and worse, been largely on the bias of the instrument itself and on its general opacity
(its internals remain a trade secret, even while the broad outlines of its function are straightforward
to infer). But in the context of the criminal justice system, fairness means and demands many
things.
7.4 Applying the Analytic Retrospectively to Unpack the COMPAS Case Study
We can use our fairness analytic to untangle the strands of the knot in the fairness debate around
criminal risk assessment systems and to understand the nature of debate for these systems. The
analytic provides a language and method to elucidate core tensions and dilemmas fueling debates
about the fairness implications of these tools. For concreteness, because it was the situation
considered in the acrimonious debate around ProPublica’s investigations of COMPAS, we will
consider fairness in the use of risk assessments to determine appropriate pre-trial sanctions (i.e.,
whether arrestees should be detained pre-arraignment or pre-trial or whether they should be releasd
on their own recognizance [115]).11
First, a theory of fairness clarifies both what fairness is expected to do in the world, as well as the
moral basis–the underlying beliefs or assumptions–that supports it. At a high level, the various
participants in the debates about criminal risk assessments might well agree that respecting each
person’s individuality and treating them with dignity and respect are relevant purposes of fairness
because the risk recidivism tool is in service of the administration of justice in society. That is, while
there is high-level agreement about the purpose of fairness, the reasons we would want COMPAS
to be deployed in fair ways, there is disagreement about the target (is fairness in this context
about giving similarly situated people similar scores or about how the criminal justice system
operates in society and whom it privileges? does it demand robust information and participation
rights?) and also the subject (Does fairness center on the interest of the accused, or also those
of the victim? Do we ascribe fairness to the outputs of the COMPAS model or to the behaviors
of the criminal justice system?). Some stakeholders, such as courts and system vendors such as
Northpointe in the debate around COMPAS, see the correct target as rating the relevant risk in
the same way for all subjects, privileging a procedural mechanism for fairness; other stakeholders,
such as ProPublica in the debate around COMPAS and civil rights organizations, view fairness
for this tool in light of consequences, noting that disparate error rates imply injust treatment for
individuals due to circumstances beyond their control (that is, their race); individuals subject to
risk assessments instead view fairness at a different scope, privileging the justice furnished in their
particular case rather than the entire function of the system overall. In the arguments around
criminal risk assessments one can see participants offering different justifications for these purposes
of fairness, ranging from the inherent sameness of individuals to recognizing past oppression. These
differences in justification relate to different positions on the relationship between theories of fairness
and justice.
This divergence becomes more apparent at the level of provision and protection. While all debate
participants might agree that a reasonable purpose for fairness is to give each person what they
deserve [147], they break down at the level of how to achieve it, that is, in our analytic, at the
11More generally, COMPAS has been considered for use at sentencing as well, and this is the source of the issue in the
Loomis case [91]. Pre-trial sanctions loom large in the discussion of risk assessments, as reducing incarcerated populations is
a major goal of criminal justice reform and in many states the bulk of the jail population is pre-sentence. This was the goal,
for example, of California’s SB10 legislation, which attempted decarceration by eliminating money bail while preserving
judges’ interests in assessing risk by creating a new pre-trial workflow for arrestees based on risk assessments [115]. Risk
assessments are also used in some cases pre-arrest, by officers exercising their discretion to cite, arrest, or refer for charges
when encountering citizens in the field, and post-sentencing to determine parole status and sanctions, as well as which
prisoners are good candidates for alternative, in-community supervision and support programs.
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dimension of target—the concrete thing fairness should deliver, and therefore the appropriate
interventions which . For judges and the criminal justice system more broadly, including the
jurisdictions which procure or develop risk assessments, the target can be conceived of as formal
equality—blindness to variables such as race and gender—except to the extent they relate to
perceived underlying risk levels of subjects as understood through historical data. For ProPublica,
the fairness target should have captured not only the procedural regularity provided by formal
equality, but—due to the unequal representation of riskiness of different populations due to historic
overpolicing of black and brown communities—also that risk assessments behave similarly in
terms of accuracy and error rates across important societal subgroups. Already, this analysis
identifies a tension within demands for fairness, and a tradeoff which must be navigated: the
demands of different stakeholders cannot simultaneously be met—the demand of formal equality
and procedural regularity cannot be squared mathematically with the demand for equal error
rates, precisely because different subjects are situated differently within society [19, 76]. Given the
individuality purpose, the target should also include not being detained based on factors beyond an
individual’s control. And due to the dignitary purpose, ProPublica’s conception of fairness includes
protections for information and participation rights (for example access to information about the
algorithm as well as the ingested data used to assess risk). Finally, the judicial context also brings
in a particular vision of the relationship between justice and fairness. Specifically, “Blackstone’s
Ratio”, the principle of law that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer” suggests that justice requires risk assessments to err toward release.
As fairness relates to society, many of ProPublica’s concerns in the COMPAS case apply to the
perspective of a citizen at large: risk assessments should function properly for every member of
society (or at least for a wide swath) to preserve overall norms of justice and to protect the social
contract [124, 125]. While fairness overlaps substantially with justice in this application context,
this observation is nearly vapid without an understanding of the interests served by justice. And
yet these are strongly contested within society. The effect on justice of applying risk assessments
within the justice system depends on where and how they are applied. For pre-trial risk assessments,
fairness can be seen from several stakeholder viewpoints, as described in the sections above. The
experience of an individual arrestee differs enormously from the perspective of a court clerk, judge,
administrator, or journalist. Further, individuals demand not only that decisions are accurate, but
that inaccurate decisions can be noted, understood, examined, challenged, and corrected in a timely
manner. Finally, most stakeholders are concerned with the principle that assessments be conducted
based on relevant and accurate information, supporting the principle of due process and tying the
operation of the computer system to the operation of the rest of the justice system.
Finally, it is critical to understand the unit of analysis and the boundary of “the system” when
discussing fairness of risk assessment systems. Are we speaking only of the fairness of the scores,
of the fairness of the scores as mediated through judicial decision-making, or of overall outcomes
with respect to pre-trial detention?12 ProPublica’s analysis of COMPAS considers primarily the
fairness of the scores in isolation [3]. Green and Chen consider the relationship of judges to the
scores, as well as issues across the rest of the criminal justice system [56]. Outcomes-oriented
measures are the purview of criminal justice policy analysis, and track closely to systems-level
concerns. Notably, the risk of unfairness is quite different in a situation where risk assessments are
used to select low-risk arrestees for automatic release vs. a robust adversarial hearing as compared
to a situation where risk assessments recommend or enforce the automatic detention of high-risk
arrestees or are used to deny individuals access to adversarial proceedings. Here, we encounter
the issue that fairness of the overall system requires that adversarial hearings which back-stop
12Other authors refer to this distinction as the “framing trap” in understanding fairness [136].
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the correctness of risk assessment outputs must be robust, in the sense that individuals must have
their interests vigorously represented, erroneous scores should be demonstrably correctable, and
adequate system resources must be available to facilitate this. Also under the heading of where
the system’s boundary falls comes the question of whether the tools are appropriate to the task:
applying a risk assessment designed to predict failure to appear is statistically inappropriate if the
question at hand is about the risk of recidivism. Applying a tool designed based on information
about prisoners or parolees is inappropriate for making predictions about pre-trial arrestees. The
assumptions of the system must reasonably relate to the boundaries of analysis.
In terms of the meaning of unfairness in the context of COMPAS, a major point of disagreement is
the validity of statistical treatment, which rates individuals based only on a defined set of features as
opposed to casuistically [11]. Here, jurisdictions have traded off the harms of statistical treatment for
efficiency in the administration of justice, but this necessitates access to information and capability
to contest erroneous decisions that is not present in COMPAS applications [91]. Statistical treatment
is especially problematic given observed differences in outcomes that can be attributed to luck
egalitarianism [2]
The COMPAS debates serve as an example of themanyways fairness can be defined, analyzed, and
operationalized within a sphere of human activity, a sociotechnical system, or a piece of technology.
It reveals the futility of assessing fairness abstractly, if one aims to deliver meaningful solutions
in practice. Going beyond the latent fissure over fairness between the legislature and the judge,
fairness in the criminal justice system is both about substantive rules and procedures—thinking
about substantive versus procedural fairness also requires thinking about different definitions,
visions, and practices of fairness. Narrow views of the intrinsic fairness of a tool in isolation (as
considered by both ProPublica and Northpointe in their lively debate) may not tell the entire
fairness story.
There are other situations in which our analytic provides a useful tool for understanding the
contours of debates about the meaning of fairness in a particular application. For example, the
use risk assessment tools for allocating resources of child protective services offices; in Allegheny
County, researchers from multiple disciplines are working with policymakers to think about what
it means to produce fair outcomes for children and their families [20]. Yet these systems have
been criticized as unjust and therefore unfair due to the ways they define risks and harms, and the
ensuing ways that cases are screened in or out of the CPS system [41]. Similarly, the New York City
Algorithms task force might benefit from tools for communicating about fairness across disciplines
as it seeks to leverage the expertise of researchers from multiple disciplines to build consensus and
develop both technical and nontechnical interventions to build sociotechnical systems that are
more fair [109].
7.5 Applying the Analytic Prospectively
As shown above the analytic assists in unpacking and understanding disputes about fairness in the
COMPAS case. However, we believe its highest use is to facilitate conversations about the concept
of fairness during earlier stages of a project. A current example of where the fairness analytic might
be productively used is in the design and analysis of pilot studies of risk assessment tools in 16
California counties recently funded by the California legislature as a precursor to the California
Money Bail Reform Act (SB 10), which eliminated the state’s system of money bail in favor of
algorithmic pretrial risk assessments. While currently stayed pending the outcome of a 2020 ballot
referendum, these pilot projects offer an opportunity to use the fairness analytic to influence how
these pilot projects are scoped, designed, and evaluated. Among other things the pilot projects aim
to “...validate and expand the use of risk assessment tools; and assess any bias.” [32] As we have
detailed above, and others have recognized, designing algorithmic tools that align with notions
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of fairness and justice is complicated [33, 40, 115]. These tools are part of larger socio-technical
systems comprised of legal rules and institutions, organizational processes, and a range of human
and technical actors. Thus analyzing fairness in their design, and assessing it based on their impact,
could be facilitated by close attention to the various dimensions identified by the analytic.
The structure of SB10 which allocates responsibility for setting policies and managing the
development of validated risk assessment tools to the Judicial Council but grants local courts
substantial discretion over the creation and implementation of the risk assessment instruments
themselves (§§1320.24.; 1320.26(a)), raises questions about how fairness will be theorized, protected,
provided, and measured. For example, as others have noted, overarching policies set by the Judicial
Council could produce particular kinds of unfairness given differing local conditions [140]. As in
the COMPAS debate discussed above, if base rates vary across localities applying globally defined
thresholds, as currently required (§1320.25.), it will produce particular kinds of unfairness. The
analytic could assist in rethinking how general policies and local realities combine to produce
particular kinds of fairness. It could support conversations that translate between theories and
provisioning in specific systems in specific local contexts. SB 10 maintains judges as the final
arbiter of pretrial release or detention decisions (See, e.g., §1320.20(f)) yet whether judges will
continue to exercise the same level of discretion over such decisions when pretrial risk assessment
reports are available is uncertain. To the extent that maintaining the judge’s centrality is essential to
fairness, the analytic could promote reflection on what mechanisms beyond the law might support
such judge’s independence—training, interface design, policies, etc. Relatedly, it could prompt
conversations about when the fairness of pilot programs is measured—for example, should the
existence of the policy of judge primacy, or empirical analysis of levels of judge independence
after the tool is introduced, be the measure of fairness? One co-author hopes to use the fairness
analytic to influence the design and evaluation of these 16 pilot programs and in future work hopes
to report on the experience.
8 DISCUSSION AND REFLECTIONS
Our definitional overview of conceptions of fairness highlights how terms are used in multiple ways
both within and between different disciplinary and professional communities, and provides the
groundwork for using these terms in ways that comprise shared understanding. Building on that,
the Fairness Analytic offers a bridging tool to bring distinct disciplines into shared conversations
about the purpose, justifications, and mechanisms for advancing fairness despite domain specific
vocabularies with often latent assumptions and politics, and the ongoing contestations about what
fairness demands in varied contexts.
We offer the Fairness Analytic as a heuristic or tool for future interdisciplinary research collabo-
rations and discussions. Rather than trying to converge on a single definitive definition of fairness,
our approach highlights the diversity of fairness conceptions that may be profitably brought into
practice. The analytic we offer may be viewed as a boundary negotiation object—an object used
to “record, organize, explore and share ideas; introduce concepts and techniques; create alliances;
create a venue for the exchange of information; augment brokering activities; and create shared
understanding” [10]. Specifically, the analytic is a compilation artifact that reflects the divergent way
terms are defined in computer science, social sciences, and law. Compilation artifacts “bring two or
more communities of practice into alignment just long enough to develop a shared and mutually
agreeable understanding of a problem and to pass crucial information from one community of
practice to another” [93]. As such, it provides a useful tool for exploring the problem space and
can help us collectively consider the definitions of concepts we have to choose from, and negotiate
shared understandings that help us bring some order to our conversations, and select the concepts
best aligned with contextually determined goals.
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Using the lens of infrastructures while curating the multiple dimensions of this term, fairness,
attuned us to the power and politics involved in using, defining, and deploying terms. In a situ-
ated context, a particular discipline’s definition or conceptualization of fairness may carry more
power or weight and be seen as the obvious or “natural” definition. Yet not recognizing other
conceptualizations, and their context of analysis, carries potential risks in missing out on other
important factors. For instance, focusing on the fairness of COMPAS in terms of fair outcomes
might obscure the need or desire to also have fair processes. Both outcomes and processes are
potential targets of fairness, and often conceptions of fairness require both. The way fairness is
conceptualized when discussing outcomes will likely be different than when discussing processes.
The definitional overview of terms helps surface this multiplicity of definitions and concepts to the
forefront when working with the values of fairness, while the analytic provides a tool for discussion
of multiple concepts of fairness. It is our hope that future researchers and practitioners reference
the definitional overview and use the analytic as a translation tool to speak and collaborate across
disciplinary boundaries, and also as a reflexive tool to be cognizant of these political and power
differences when moving among different uses of this value. The analytic may also be used as a
way to support meaningful contestation, as a way to make clear the differences among assumptions
and meanings that stakeholders brings to discussions of fairness.
The lens of infrastructures also suggest paying attention to ongoing maintenance practices of
sociotechnical systems as moments for values to (re)emerge as salient for debate and design. In
this spirit, the definitional overview and are analytic are not a “complete” artifacts; the definitional
overview does not provide an exhaustive specification of every possible definition for the set
of values across every possible discipline, nor is the analytic a complete specification of every
dimension across which fairness might be dissected. Rather, the coverage of these terms and
dimensions provides a specific starting point to support and expand researchers’ ongoing capacity
to converse and collaborate across boundaries. Together the definitional overview and analytic
also help clarify different contexts of usage, so that these ongoing moments of debate can lead to
“meaningful contestation” [107] rather than talking past one another.
We also note that the definitional overview and analytic should be considered as parts of a
broader ecosystem of social and technical infrastructures among this interdisciplinary community
interested in fairness in (socio)technical systems. The usefulness of these tools will emerge in
relation to other sociotechnical infratructuring practices, such as: the creation and maintenance
of spaces for discussion and collaborations including workshops, conferences, research groups,
and discussion forums; training and teaching within multiple communities of practice; or funding
mechanisms for projects in these domains. The future contributions of the definitional overview
and analytic may be in the work it helps us organize, or the heightened form of organization in
the field that working with and through them might yield. Future work may also investigate the
multiplicity of related terms accountability, transparency, and explainability. As Hunsinger et al.
write, “infrastructure is indeed a fundamentally relational concept; it emerges for people in practice,
connected to activities and structures” [69]. The definitional overview and analytic are an effort at
infrastructuring for the community of scholars and practitioners studying fairness, accountability,
transparency, explainability, and related concepts as they apply to computer systems; as such it is
part object, part process, and—we hope—part practice.
9 CONCLUSION
The concept of fairness is vast and ambiguous, and differently used across disciplines. Research
and practice aimed at advancing these properties in sociotechnical systems powered by machine
learning algorithms requires cross-disciplinary engagement. A shared definitional overview and
Fairness Analytic that helps map variations on fairness within and across disciplines and domains
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is a necessary, but insufficient, element of the infrastructure to support such work. By enabling
researchers from different backgrounds to recognize when terms are being used differently, and
potentially settle on shared understandings for specific projects, our conceptual analytic can
help researchers collaborate and sustain political debates about what fairness is for and what it
demands of sociotechnical systems. A more careful understanding of fairness will lead to better
cross-disciplinary collaborations both studying and building systems. Finally, infrastructuring is a
political task. The taxonomies we construct and the dimensions we reveal in the analytic, and how
we use and deploy them, will shape the research agenda and outputs created. It will also determine
how well they meet the needs of society.
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A AN ANALYTIC FOR APPLYING CONTESTED CONCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS IN
COMPUTER SYSTEMS
Dimension of
Fairness
Description of
Dimension
Example of
Dimension
Interrogation
Questions
Dimensions of Theory
Purpose That which fairness
provides or con-
tributes to those
protected.
◦ Individuality (i.e.,
not viewed as a
statistic)
◦ Dignity (ability to
participate)
◦ Respect (pre-
sentation of
self/recognition of
self)
◦ Empathy (recog-
nition of unequal
starting points,
capacities, etc.)
What is fairness for?
Justification That which justifies
fairness, i.e., fairness
is justified because of
X
◦ Historical Oppres-
sion (Racism, Sex-
ism, etc.)
◦ Inherent sameness
◦ Diminishing
impact of
luck/uncontrolled
benefits & risks
◦ Social Welfare
◦ Self development
◦ Incentives for X
◦ Rewards for X
◦ Reparations
Why should this be
fair?
Contrast Concept That which contrasts
to fairness, i.e., that
which is fair is mu-
tually exclusive with
that which is X
◦ Inequality
◦ Bias
◦ Discrimination
◦ Racism, Sexism
What’s not fair?
Exemplar The prototype of fair-
ness, i.e., fairness is
best illustrated by X
“one person, one
vote”
What’s an example?
Table 1. Dimensions of theory for contests over fairness.
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Dimension of
Fairness
Description of
Dimension
Example of
Dimension
Interrogation
Questions
Relationship to Society
Relationship to Jus-
tice
The extent to which
fairness overlaps with
or supports justice.
◦ Distributive justice
◦ Retributive justice
◦ Compensatory jus-
tice
How does justice re-
late to fairness?
Stakeholder View-
point
Fair as seen from
whose point of view?
(This person might
not be the subject of
fairness analysis.)
Stakeholder view-
point
Fair as seen from
whose point of view?
(This person might
not be the subject of
fairness analysis.)
Boundary of the Sys-
tem
The scope of the sys-
tem being evaluated
for fairness.
◦ Technical System
◦ Technical system
and user
◦ Technical system
and user and
organization
◦ Technical system
and user and
organization and
norms/regulations
What is the (socio-
)technical system that
is being made fair?
Dimensions of Unfairness
Action That which con-
tributes or constitutes
unfairness
◦ Unequal treat-
ment/discrimination
◦ Unequal outcomes
◦ Unequal process
◦ Stereotyping
◦ Statistical Treat-
ment
What violates fair-
ness?
Offender Actor(s) violating fair-
ness, i.e., fairness vio-
lated by agent X.
◦ Government
◦ Business entity
◦ Individual
Who violates fair-
ness?
Consequences of un-
fairness
What harms result
from a defecit of fair-
ness?
◦ Loss of benefits
◦ Loss of dignity
◦ Loss of autonomy
For stakeholders of
the system, what are
the consequences of
failing to realize fair-
ness?
Table 2. Dimensions of unfairness for contests over fairness.
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Dimension of
Fairness
Description of
Dimension
Example of
Dimension
Interrogation
Questions
Dimensions of Protection
Target The ideal end state to-
ward which fairness
aspires. At a high
level, this could be
substantive or proce-
dural.
◦ Formal equality
(blind to all other
variables)—to each
person an equal
share;
◦ Need-based
allocation—to each
person according
to individual need;
◦ Effort-based
allocation—to each
person according
to individaul effort;
◦ Social
contribution—
to each person
according to soci-
etal contribution;
◦ Merit-based
allocation—to each
person according
to merit;
◦ Information and
participation rights
◦ Accurate and ro-
bust representation
What should fairness
provide?
Subject (and, in
relation to
who/what?)
Actor(s) or Entity(ies)
to whom fairness is
provided.
◦ Individual
◦ Social Groups
◦ Roles
Fairness is at stake for
whom or what?
Fairness is often used
comparatively, requir-
ing the construction
of categories along
some attribute or set
of attributes.
What properties
or attributes are
being made fair?
What groups are
being compared?
Granularity?
Table 3. Dimensions of protection for contests over fairness.
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 119. Publication date: November 2019.
119:30 Mulligan, Kroll, Kohli, and Wong
Dimension of
Fairness
Description of
Dimension
Example of
Dimension
Interrogation
Questions
Dimensions of Provision
Provider Actor(s) charged with
being fair or avoiding
unfairness.
◦ Government
◦ Business entity
◦ Technology
◦ Individuals
Who or what is sup-
posed to behave fairly
or avoid unfair behav-
ior?
Mechanism Modalities used to
support fairness.
◦ Legal regulations
◦ Technical design
◦ Business processes
◦ Education
◦ Norms
How is fairness oper-
ationalized?
Implementer Actor(s) tasked with
operationalizing fair-
ness through chosen
modalities.
◦ Lawyers
◦ Engineers
◦ Product Managers
◦ Designers
◦ Professional associ-
ations
◦ Educators
Who brings fairness
into practice?
Dimensions of Context
Social Practice That wherein fairness
applies, i.e., a situa-
tion, a field, a site, a
model.
◦ Hospital or Univer-
sity
◦ Nation-State or
Globally
What is the context of
fairness?
Scope Extent of application
of fairness, i.e., fair
should be applied at
scope X.
◦ Universally as strict
rule
◦ Casuistically as per-
case
How widely does fair-
ness apply?
Time The time period(s)
over which fairness
is measured and
observed, i.e., fairness
applies for span X of
time.
◦ Before decisions
are made
◦ When decisions are
made
◦ After decisions are
made
When is fairness ob-
served? When do we
measure what is fair?
Is this a static process
or a dynamic one?
Table 4. Dimensions of provision and context for contests over fairness.
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 119. Publication date: November 2019.
This Thing Called Fairness: Disciplinary Confusion Realizing a Value in Technology 119:31
REFERENCES
[1] Aws Albarghouthi, Loris D’Antoni, Samuel Drews, and Aditya Nori. 2016. Fairness as a program property. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1610.06067 (2016).
[2] Elizabeth S Anderson. 1999. What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109, 2 (1999), 287–337.
[3] Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner. 2016. Machine Bias. ProPublica (23 May 2016).
[4] Kenneth J Arrow. 1950. A difficulty in the concept of social welfare. Journal of political economy 58, 4 (1950), 328–346.
[5] Chelsea Barabas, Karthik Dinakar, Joichi Ito Virza, Jonathan Zittrain, et al. 2018. Interventions over predictions:
Reframing the ethical debate for actuarial risk assessment. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
(2018).
[6] Charles R Beitz. 1989. Political equality: An essay in democratic theory. Princeton University Press.
[7] Jeremy Bentham. 1789. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation.
[8] Richard Berk. 2019. Machine Learning Risk Assessments in Criminal Justice Settings. Springer.
[9] Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns, and Aaron Roth. 2018. Fairness in criminal justice risk
assessments: The state of the art. Sociological Methods & Research (2018), 0049124118782533.
[10] Matthew J Bietz and Charlotte P Lee. 2009. Collaboration in metagenomics: Sequence databases and the organization
of scientific work. In ECSCW 2009. Springer, 243–262.
[11] Reuben Binns, Max Van Kleek, Michael Veale, Ulrik Lyngs, Jun Zhao, and Nigel Shadbolt. 2018. ’It’s Reducing a Human
Being to a Percentage’: Perceptions of Justice in Algorithmic Decisions. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 377.
[12] Gabriela Bodea, Kristina Karanikolova, Deirdre K. Mulligan, and Jael Makagon. 2018. Automated decision-making
on the basis of personal data that has been transferred from the EU to companies certified under the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield: Fact-finding and assessment of safeguards provided by U.S. law. Technical Report. European Commission.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/independent{_}study{_}on{_}automated{_}decision-making.pdf
[13] Francisco Bonchi, Carlos Castillo, and Sara Hajian. 2016. Algorithmic bias: from discrimination discovery to fairness-
aware data mining. Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Tutorials Track.
[14] Geoffrey C Bowker, Karen Baker, Florence Millerand, and David Ribes. 2009. Toward information infrastructure
studies: Ways of knowing in a networked environment. In International handbook of internet research. 97–117.
[15] Geoffrey C Bowker, C Geoffrey, W Bernard Carlson, et al. 1994. Science on the run: Information management and
industrial geophysics at Schlumberger, 1920-1940. MIT press.
[16] Geoffrey C Bowker and Susan Leigh Star. 2000. Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. MIT press.
[17] John Broome. 1990. Fairness. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 91. JSTOR, 87–101.
[18] Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru. 2018. Gender shades: Intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial gender
classification. In Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. 77–91.
[19] Alexandra Chouldechova. 2017. Fair prediction with disparate impact: A study of bias in recidivism prediction
instruments. Big data 5, 2 (2017), 153–163.
[20] Alexandra Chouldechova, Diana Benavides-Prado, Oleksandr Fialko, and Rhema Vaithianathan. 2018. A case study
of algorithm-assisted decision making in child maltreatment hotline screening decisions. In Conference on Fairness,
Accountability and Transparency. 134–148.
[21] Angèle Christin. 2017. Algorithms in practice: Comparing web journalism and criminal justice. Big Data & Society 4,
2 (2017).
[22] David D Clark, JohnWroclawski, Karen R Sollins, and Robert Braden. 2002. Tussle in cyberspace: defining tomorrow’s
internet. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Vol. 32:4. ACM, 347–356.
[23] Computing Community Consortium. 2015. Privacy by Design—Engineering Privacy: Workshop 3 Report. https:
//cra.org/ccc/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/12/PbD3-Workshop-Report-v2.pdf.
[24] Computing Community Consortium. 2015. Privacy by Design—Privacy Enabling Design: Workshop 2 Report.
https://cra.org/ccc/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/05/PbD2-Report-v5.pdf.
[25] Computing Community Consortium. 2015. Privacy by Design-State of Research and Practice: Workshop 1 Report.
https://cra.org/ccc/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/02/PbD-Workshop-1-Report-.pdf.
[26] Brice Cooke, Binta Zahra Diop, Alissa Fishbane, Jonathan Hayes, Aurelie Ouss, and Anuj Shah. 2018. Using Behavioral
Science to Improve Criminal Justice Outcomes.
[27] Alissa Cooper, Hannes Tschofenig, Bernard Aboba, Jon Peterson, J. Morris, Marit Hansen, and Rhys Smith. 2013.
RFC 6973: Privacy considerations for Internet protocols. Internet Engineering Task Force, https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc6973.
[28] Sam Corbett-Davies and Sharad Goel. 2018. The measure and mismeasure of fairness: A critical review of fair machine
learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.00023 (2018).
[29] Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, and Sharad Goel. 2016. A computer program used for bail and
sentencing decisions was labeled biased against blacks. It’s actually not that clear. Washington Post.
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 119. Publication date: November 2019.
119:32 Mulligan, Kroll, Kohli, and Wong
[30] Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel, and Aziz Huq. 2017. Algorithmic decision making
and the cost of fairness. In ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. ACM,
797–806.
[31] Thomas H Cormen, Charles E Leiserson, Ronald L Rivest, and Clifford Stein. 2009. Introduction to algorithms. MIT
press.
[32] California Judicial Council. 2019. Judicial Council Funds 16 Pretrial Pilot Programs. https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/
news/judicial-council-funds-16-pretrial-pilot-programs
[33] Bo Cowgill. 2018. The impact of algorithms on judicial discretion: Evidence from regression discontinuities. Technical
Report. Working paper.
[34] Kimberle Crenshaw. 1990. Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of
color. Stan. L. Rev. 43 (1990), 1241.
[35] Nicholas Diakopoulos. 2015. Algorithmic accountability: Journalistic investigation of computational power structures.
Digital Journalism 3, 3 (2015).
[36] William Dieterich, Christina Mendoza, and Tim Brennan. 2016. COMPAS risk scales: Demonstrating accuracy equity
and predictive parity.
[37] Julia Dressel and Hany Farid. 2018. The accuracy, fairness, and limits of predicting recidivism. Science advances 4, 1
(2018), eaao5580.
[38] Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt, Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold, and Richard Zemel. 2012. Fairness through awareness.
In Proceedings of the 3rd innovations in theoretical computer science conference. ACM, 214–226.
[39] Ronald Dworkin. 2013. Taking rights seriously. Bloomsbury Academic.
[40] Jessica M Eaglin. 2017. Constructing recidivism risk. Emory Law Journal 67 (2017), 59.
[41] Virginia Eubanks. 2018. Automating inequality: How high-tech tools profile, police, and punish the poor. St. Martin’s
Press.
[42] fat Since 2018. The ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT∗). https://fatconference.org.
[43] fatml Since 2014. The Workshop on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning (FAT/ML).
https://fatml.org.
[44] Federal Trade Commision (FTC). 2016. Big Data: A tool for inclusion or exclusion? Tech-
nical Report. Federal Trade Commission. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf
[45] Mary Flanagan, Daniel C. Howe, and Helen Nissenbaum. 2005. Values at Play: Design Tradeoffs in Socially-oriented
Game Design. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’05). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 751–760. https://doi.org/10.1145/1054972.1055076
[46] Mary Flanagan, Daniel C Howe, and Helen Nissenbaum. 2008. Embodying values in technology: Theory and practice.
Information technology and moral philosophy 322 (2008).
[47] Anthony W Flores, Kristin Bechtel, and Christopher T Lowenkamp. 2016. False Positives, False Negatives, and False
Analyses: A Rejoinder to Machine Bias: There’s Software Used across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And
It’s Biased against Blacks. Fed. Probation 80 (2016), 38.
[48] Batya Friedman. 1996. Value-sensitive design. interactions 3, 6 (1996), 16–23. https://doi.org/10.1145/242485.242493
[49] Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn, and Alan Borning. 2008. Value Sensitive Design and Information Systems. In The
Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, Kenneth Einar Himma and Herman T. Tavani (Eds.). John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., Chapter 4, 69–101.
[50] Batya Friedman and Helen Nissenbaum. 1996. Bias in computer systems. ACM Transactions on Information Systems
(TOIS) 14, 3 (1996).
[51] Walter Bryce Gallie. 1955. Essentially contested concepts. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, Vol. 56. 167–198.
[52] Brandon L Garrett and John Monahan. Forthcoming. Judging Risk. Cal. L. Rev. (Forthcoming).
[53] Allan Gibbard. 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric
Society (1973), 587–601.
[54] Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, Jennifer L Skeem, and Christopher Slobogin. 2019. The Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence
of Criminal Risk Assessment. In Research Handbook on Big Data Law.
[55] Charles AE Goodhart. 1984. Problems of monetary management: the UK experience. In Monetary Theory and Practice.
Springer, 91–121.
[56] Ben Green and Yiling Chen. 2019. Disparate interactions: An algorithm-in-the-loop analysis of fairness in risk
assessments. In Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency. ACM, 90–99.
[57] Moritz Hardt and Solon Barocas. 2017. Fairness in Machine Learning. Neural Information Processing Symposium,
Tutorials Track.
[58] Moritz Hardt, Solon Barocas, and Arvind Narayanan. 2018. Fairness inMachine Learning: Limitations and Opportunities.
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 119. Publication date: November 2019.
This Thing Called Fairness: Disciplinary Confusion Realizing a Value in Technology 119:33
[59] Moritz Hardt, Nimrod Megiddo, Christos Papadimitriou, and Mary Wootters. 2016. Strategic classification. In
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM conference on innovations in theoretical computer science. ACM, 111–122.
[60] Moritz Hardt, Eric Price, and Nathan Srebro. 2016. Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning. Neural Information
Processing Symposium (2016).
[61] Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. 1961. The concept of law. Oxford University Press.
[62] Deborah Hellman. 2008. When is discrimination wrong? Harvard University Press.
[63] Melanie Herschel, Ralf Diestelkämper, and Houssem Ben Lahmar. 2017. A survey on provenance: What for? What
form? What from? The VLDB Journal 26, 6 (2017), 881–906.
[64] Thomas Hobbes. 1651. Leviathan. (1651).
[65] Anna Lauren Hoffmann. 2017. Data, technology, and gender: Thinking about (and from) trans lives. In Spaces for the
Future. Routledge, 3–13. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203735657-1
[66] Kenneth Holstein, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Hal Daumé III, Miro Dudik, and Hanna Wallach. 2019. Improving
fairness in machine learning systems: What do industry practitioners need?. In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 600.
[67] Lara Houston, Steven J Jackson, Daniela K Rosner, Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed, Meg Young, and Laewoo Kang. 2016. Values
in Repair. In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’16. ACM Press,
New York, New York, USA, 1403–1414. https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858470
[68] Lily Hu, Nicole Immorlica, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 2018. The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.08646 (2018).
[69] Jeremy Hunsinger, Lisbeth Klastrup, and Matthew Allen. 2010. International handbook of internet research. Springer.
[70] Lilly Irani and M. Six Silberman. 2014. From critical design to critical infrastructure. Interactions 21, 4 (2014), 32–35.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2627392
[71] Steven J. Jackson, Tarleton Gillespie, and Sandy Payette. 2014. The Policy Knot: Re-integrating Policy, Practice and
Design in Cscw Studies of Social Computing. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer Supported
Cooperative Work &#38; Social Computing (CSCW ’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 588–602. https://doi.org/10.1145/
2531602.2531674
[72] Abigail Z. Jacobs and Hanna Wallach. 2018. Measurement and Fairness. Manuscript, on file with authors (2018).
[73] Nassim JafariNaimi, Lisa Nathan, and Ian Hargraves. 2015. Values as Hypotheses: Design, Inquiry, and the Service of
Values. Design Issues 31, 4 (oct 2015), 91–104. https://doi.org/10.1162/DESI_a_00354
[74] Paul Jeffrey. 2003. Smoothing the waters: Observations on the process of cross-disciplinary research collaboration.
Social Studies of Science 33, 4 (2003), 539–562.
[75] Os Keyes. 2018. The Misgendering Machines: Trans/HCI Implications of Automatic Gender Recognition. Proceedings
of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 2, CSCW (nov 2018), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1145/3274357
[76] Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Manish Raghavan. 2016. Inherent trade-offs in the fair determination of
risk scores. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.05807 (2016).
[77] Daniel Kluttz, Jenna Burrell, Deirdre Mulligan, Joshua A. Kroll, Amit Elazari, and Andrew Smart. 2018. Report from the
First AFOG SummerWorkshop. https://afog.berkeley.edu/2018/08/13/report-from-the-first-afog-summer-workshop/.
[78] Cory Knobel and Geoffrey C. Bowker. 2011. Values in design. Commun. ACM 54 (2011), 26. https://doi.org/10.1145/
1965724.1965735
[79] Donald Ervin Knuth. 1968. The art of computer programming: fundamental algorithms. Vol. 1. Pearson Education.
[80] Issa Kohler-Hausmann. 2018. Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking About Detecting
Racial Discrimination. Available at SSRN, https:// ssrn.com/abstract=3050650 (2018).
[81] Nitin Kohli and Paul Laskowski. 2018. Epsilon Voting: Mechanism Design for Parameter Selection in Differential
Privacy. In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Privacy-Aware Computing (PAC). IEEE, 19–30.
[82] Christine M Korsgaard. 1996. Creating the kingdom of ends. Cambridge University Press.
[83] Christine M Korsgaard, Christine Marion Korsgaard, Gerald Allan Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and
Bernard Williams. 1996. The sources of normativity. Cambridge University Press.
[84] Joshua A. Kroll. 2015. Accountable Algorithms. Ph.D. Dissertation. Princeton University.
[85] Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson, and Harlan
Yu. 2017. Accountable Algorithms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 165, 3 (2017).
[86] Joshua A. Kroll, Nitin Kohli, and Deirdre Mulligan. 2018. Common Pitfalls for Studying the Human Side of Machine
Learning. Tutorial at the Neural Information Processing Symposium (NeurIPS).
[87] Joshua A. Kroll and Emmanuel Moss. 2019. Conceptions, Definitions, and Practices of Fair, Transparent, and
Accountable AI. Partnership on AI (2019).
[88] Matt J Kusner, Joshua Loftus, Chris Russell, and Ricardo Silva. 2017. Counterfactual fairness. In Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems. 4066–4076.
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 119. Publication date: November 2019.
119:34 Mulligan, Kroll, Kohli, and Wong
[89] Bruno Latour. 1989. The moral dilemmas of a safety belt. Alliage 1 (1989), 21–27. Originally published as “La ceinture
de sécurité”. Unpublished English translation by Lydia Davis.
[90] Bruno Latour. 1992. Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts. In Shaping
Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, Wiebe Bijker and John Law (Eds.). MIT Press, 225–258.
[91] Law Review Editors. 2017. State v. Loomis. 130 Harvard Law Review 1530, https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/03/
state-v-loomis/.
[92] Christopher A. Le Dantec, Erika Shehan Poole, and Susan P. Wyche. 2009. Values as lived experience: Evolving value
sensitive design in support of value discovery. In Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Human factors in
computing systems - CHI 09. ACM Press, New York, New York, USA, 1141. https://doi.org/10.1145/1518701.1518875
[93] Charlotte P Lee. 2005. Between chaos and routine: Boundary negotiating artifacts in collaboration. In ECSCW 2005.
Springer, 387–406.
[94] Min Kyung Lee and Su Baykal. 2017. Algorithmic Mediation in Group Decisions: Fairness Perceptions of Algo-
rithmically Mediated vs. Discussion-Based Social Division. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Com-
puter Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing (CSCW ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1035–1048.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2998181.2998230
[95] Zeus Leonardo. 2004. The Color of Supremacy: Beyond the discourse of ’white privilege’. Educational Philosophy and
Theory 36, 2 (2004), 137–152. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2004.00057.x
[96] Lawrence Lessig. 1999. Code: And other laws of cyberspace. Basic Books, New York.
[97] Zachary C Lipton, Alexandra Chouldechova, and Julian McAuley. 2017. Does mitigating ML’s impact disparity require
treatment disparity? arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.07076 (2017).
[98] Kenneth O May. 1952. A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1952), 680–684.
[99] Peggy McIntosh. 2001. White privilege and male privilege: A personal account of coming to see correspondences
through work in Women’s studies (1988). Race, class, and gender: An anthology (2001).
[100] Samuel Messick. 1987. Validity. ETS Research Report Series 1987, 2 (1987), i–208.
[101] John Stuart Mill. 1861. Utilitarianism.
[102] Smitha Milli, John Miller, Anca D Dragan, and Moritz Hardt. 2018. The Social Cost of Strategic Classification. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1808.08460 (2018).
[103] Shira Mitchell, Eric Potash, and Solon Barocas. 2018. Prediction-Based Decisions and Fairness: A Catalogue of Choices,
Assumptions, and Definitions. arXiv preprint: 1811.07867 (2018).
[104] Shira Mitchell and Jackie Shadlen. 2018. Mirror, Mirror: Reflections on Quantitative Fairness. shiramitchell.github.io/
fairness.
[105] Hervé Moulin. 1980. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice 35, 4 (1980), 437–455.
[106] Deirdre K Mulligan and Kenneth A Bamberger. 2018. Saving Governance-by-Design. California Law Review 106, 101
(2018).
[107] Deirdre K Mulligan, Colin Koopman, and Nick Doty. 2016. Privacy is an essentially contested concept: a multi-
dimensional analytic for mapping privacy. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 374, 2083 (2016), 20160118.
[108] Arvind Narayanan. 2018. 21 Definitions of Fairness and Their Politics. Tutorial Presented at the First Conference on
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT∗).
[109] New York City Press Office. 2018. Mayor de Blasio Announces First-In-Nation Task Force To Examine Au-
tomated Decision Systems Used By The City. https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/251-18/
mayor-de-blasio-first-in-nation-task-force-examine-automated-decision-systems-used-by
[110] Helen Nissenbaum. 2001. How computer systems embody values. Computer 34, 3 (mar 2001), 120–119. https:
//doi.org/10.1109/2.910905
[111] Helen Nissenbaum. 2005. Values in technical design. In Encyclopedia of science, technology, and ethics. Macmillan
New York, NY, 66–70.
[112] Merel Noorman. 2017. Justice. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (Ed.). https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/justice/
[113] Martha C Nussbaum. 1986. The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy. Cambridge
University Press.
[114] Martha C Nussbaum. 1999. Virtue ethics: a misleading category? The Journal of Ethics 3, 3 (1999), 163–201.
[115] Partnership onAI. 2019. Report onAlgorithmic Risk Assessment Tools in the U.S. Criminal Justice System. https://www.
partnershiponai.org/report-on-machine-learning-in-risk-assessment-tools-in-the-u-s-criminal-justice-system/.
(2019).
[116] Samir Passi and Steven Jackson. 2017. Data Vision: Learning to See Through Algorithmic Abstraction. In Proceedings
of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing - CSCW ’17. ACM Press,
New York, New York, USA, 2436–2447. https://doi.org/10.1145/2998181.2998331
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 119. Publication date: November 2019.
This Thing Called Fairness: Disciplinary Confusion Realizing a Value in Technology 119:35
[117] Samir Passi and Steven J Jackson. 2018. Trust in Data Science: Collaboration, Translation, and Accountability in
Corporate Data Science Projects. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 2, CSCW (nov 2018), 1–28.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3274405
[118] Beatriz Pérez, Julio Rubio, and Carlos Sáenz-Adán. 2018. A systematic review of provenance systems. Knowledge and
Information Systems (2018), 1–49.
[119] Fred L Pincus. 1996. Discrimination comes in many forms: Individual, institutional, and structural. American
Behavioral Scientist 40, 2 (1996), 186–194.
[120] Zachary Piso. 2016. Integration, Values, and Well-Ordered Interdisciplinary Science. the pluralist 11, 1 (2016), 49–57.
[121] Ariel D Procaccia. 2015. Cake cutting algorithms. In Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 13.
[122] Kevin M Quinn, Burt L Monroe, Michael Colaresi, Michael H Crespin, and Dragomir R Radev. 2010. How to analyze
political attention with minimal assumptions and costs. American Journal of Political Science 54, 1 (2010), 209–228.
[123] Jeffrey J Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie. 2008. Does unconscious racial bias
affect trial judges. Notre Dame L. Rev. 84 (2008), 1195.
[124] John Rawls. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement. Harvard University Press.
[125] John Rawls. 2009. A theory of justice. Harvard university press.
[126] Joel R Reidenberg. 1997. Lex informatica: The formulation of information policy rules through technology. Tex. L.
Rev. 76 (1997), 553.
[127] Daniela K. Rosner and Morgan Ames. 2014. Designing for repair?: infrastructures and materialities of breakdown. In
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work & social computing - CSCW ’14. ACM
Press, Baltimore, 319–331. https://doi.org/10.1145/2531602.2531692
[128] Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 1762. The social contract.
[129] Alan Ryan. 2006. Fairness and philosophy. social research (2006), 597–606.
[130] Christian Sandvig. 2015. Seeing the sort: The aesthetic and industrial defense of “the algorithm”. Journal of the New
Media Caucus (2015).
[131] Mark Allen Satterthwaite. 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems
for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of economic theory 10, 2 (1975), 187–217.
[132] Thomas Scanlon. 1998. What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press.
[133] Thomas Scanlon. 2004. When does equality matter? unpublished paper (2004), 15.
[134] Arthur Schopenhauer. 1840. On the basis of morality.
[135] Nick Seaver. 2017. Algorithms as culture: Some tactics for the ethnography of algorithmic systems. Big Data & Society
4, 2 (2017).
[136] Andrew D Selbst, Danah Boyd, Sorelle A Friedler, Suresh Venkatasubramanian, and Janet Vertesi. 2019. Fairness and
abstraction in sociotechnical systems. In Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency.
ACM, 59–68.
[137] Katie Shilton. 2018. Values and Ethics in Human-Computer Interaction. Foundations and Trends in Human-Computer
Interaction 12, 2 (2018), 107–171. https://doi.org/10.1561/1100000073
[138] Katie Shilton, Jes A. Koepfler, and Kenneth R. Fleischmann. 2014. How to see values in social computing: Methods for
Studying Values Dimensions. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work &
Social Computing (CSCW ’14). 426–435. https://doi.org/10.1145/2531602.2531625
[139] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. 2003. Consequentialism. (2003).
[140] Alicia Solow-Niederman, YooJung Choi, and Guy Van den Broeck. 2019. The Institutional Life of Algorithmic Risk
Assessment. Berkeley Technology Law Journal (2019).
[141] Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder. 1994. Steps towards an ecology of infrastructure: complex problems in design
and access for large-scale collaborative systems. In Proceedings of the 1994 ACM conference on Computer supported
cooperative work. ACM, 253–264.
[142] Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder. 1996. Steps toward an ecology of infrastructure: Design and access for large
information spaces. Information systems research 7, 1 (1996), 111–134.
[143] Stephanie B Steinhardt. 2016. Breaking Down While Building Up: Design and Decline in Emerging Infrastructures. In
Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’16. ACM Press, New York, New
York, USA, 2198–2208. https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858420
[144] Stephanie B Steinhardt and Steven J Jackson. 2014. Reconciling rhythms: Plans and Temporal Alignment in Collabo-
rative Scientific Work. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work & social
computing - CSCW ’14. ACM Press, New York, New York, USA, 134–145. https://doi.org/10.1145/2531602.2531736
[145] Megan Stevenson. 2018. Assessing risk assessment in action. Minn. L. Rev. 103 (2018), 303.
[146] Patrick Tomlin. 2012. Can I be a Luck Egalitarian and a Rawlsian? Ethical Perspectives 19, 3 (2012), 371.
[147] Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, T Shanks, and Michael J Meyer. 2014. Justice and fairness. Issues in Ethics 3, 2 (2014).
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 119. Publication date: November 2019.
119:36 Mulligan, Kroll, Kohli, and Wong
[148] Sahil Verma and Julia Rubin. 2018. Fairness definitions explained. In 2018 IEEE/ACM International Workshop on
Software Fairness (FairWare). IEEE, 1–7.
[149] Sandra Wachter and Brent Mittelstadt. 2019. A right to reasonable inferences: re-thinking data protection law in the
age of big data and AI. Columbia Business Law Review (2019).
[150] SusannWagenknecht, Min Lee, Caitlin Lustig, Jacki O’Neill, and Himanshu Zade. 2016. Algorithms at Work: Empirical
Diversity, Analytic Vocabularies, Design Implications. In Proceedings of the 19th ACMConference on Computer Supported
Cooperative Work and Social Computing Companion - CSCW ’16 Companion. ACM Press, New York, New York, USA,
536–543. https://doi.org/10.1145/2818052.2855519
[151] Langdon Winner. 1980. Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus 109, 1 (1980), 121–136.
[152] Christine T Wolf, Haiyi Zhu, Julia Bullard, Min Kyung Lee, and Jed R Brubaker. 2018. The Changing Contours of
"Participation" in Data-driven, Algorithmic Ecosystems: Challenges, Tactics, and an Agenda. In Companion of the
2018 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing - CSCW ’18. ACM Press, New
York, New York, USA, 377–384. https://doi.org/10.1145/3272973.3273005
[153] Tim Wu. 2003. Network neutrality, broadband discrimination. J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 2 (2003), 141.
[154] Haiyi Zhu, Bowen Yu, Aaron Halfaker, and Loren Terveen. 2018. Value-Sensitive Algorithm Design: Method,
Case Study, and Lessons. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 2, CSCW (nov 2018), 1–23.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3274463
[155] Malte Ziewitz. 2017. A not quite random walk: Experimenting with the ethnomethods of the algorithm. Big Data &
Society 4, 2 (2017).
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 119. Publication date: November 2019.
